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The ceremonial welcome of the Soviet party and government delegation on May 30, 1979, at Ferihegy (now Liszt Ferenc) Airport in Budapest. In the center: János Kádár (First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Behind Brezhnev Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (Fortepan / Chuckyeager tumblr)

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

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The Hungarian-Austrian border, the “Iron Curtain”, 1970. Photo donated by Fortepan

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East Berlin, „Unter den Linden." The Brandenburg Gate in the background, 1956.

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= = = = Péter Bencsik =

/// Immutability, Inviolability, Permeability

The German Question and the Role of Borders Before and After Helsinki

Abstract

An event, originally called the European Security Conference (ESC), was initiated by the leaders of the Soviet bloc (Molotov in 1954 and Rapacki in 1965). The aim of the conference was to guarantee the borders established after 1945. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not recognize the "provisional" borders of Potsdam in the absence of a German peace treaty. By the time negotiations began in Helsinki, two significant events had changed the situation. (1) Willy Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* led to the conclusion of treaties between the FRG and the socialist states, which declared the inviolability of the existing borders, thus rendering the original objective of the ESC almost obsolete. (2) The West persuaded the Warsaw Pact countries to supplement their security issues with discussions on cooperation. The latter constituted the second and third "baskets" of the Helsinki Conference. Within the third basket (humanitarian cooperation), Eastern Bloc countries signed recommendations on the permeability of borders. Except for a few reformist states, the Warsaw Pact countries significantly restricted the movement of their own citizens across borders. Despite their commitments, they still did not want to "facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons", as the Final Act recommended. The protests of opposition groups that emerged after Helsinki were relatively easy to suppress—at least in those states that were not indebted and thus could not be blackmailed into granting further loans.

= = = Introduction

After 1945, several new borders were established in Eastern and Central Europe. These were drawn primarily in accordance with the interests of the Soviet Union. The victorious country, which had risen to become a superpower, successfully

persuaded the Anglo-Saxon powers to accept as its western border essentially the same line that Hitler had approved in 1939 in the secret protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. In fact, it went even further than that, as the area around Königsberg and Carpathian Ruthenia also became Soviet territory. Consequently, Poland—one of the first victims of World War II—lost 180,000 km² of its pre-1939 territory. The Anglo-Saxon powers, and even the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, agreed that the Poles deserved compensation, which was provided at the expense of defeated Germany; 101,000 km² of German territory east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse Rivers was annexed by Poland, with the possibility of the complete deportation of Germans living there. The idea of the Oder–Neisse border was raised at the Crimean Conference and then decided upon at the Potsdam Conference. In 1945, all this was intended to be temporary, with the final decision to be made at the peace conference. However, no peace treaty was signed with Germany in 1947 or later. Furthermore, the remaining German territories, divided into four sectors, underwent different developments, ultimately resulting in the division of Germany in 1949.

In the absence of a peace treaty, neither the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) nor the German Democratic Republic (GDR) initially recognized the Oder–Neisse border. It was in Stalin's interest to keep the border issue open, as both Poland and the GDR hoped that the Soviets would rule in their favor in the territorial dispute. The GDR finally recognized the Oder–Neisse border in the summer of 1950 but unofficially continued to harbor "revisionist" intentions. Along with other reasons, this caused serious tensions in East German–Polish relations, which lasted until the construction of the Berlin Wall.[1] Bonn's territorial claims remained in place in the longer term. The West German governments did not recognize the existence of the GDR or the Polish–German border. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer set the goal of restoring the 1937 borders. In 1955, Germany formulated the Hallstein Doctrine, according to which the FRG would not establish, or would sever, diplomatic relations with states that recognized the GDR.[2] After the rearmament of West Germany and its accession to NATO (1955), the Poles and East Germans became increasingly alarmed, but they were only able to establish active cooperation in the 1960s. This was mainly because Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, who started out as a reformer, gradually shifted his domestic policy in a dogmatic direction, making it easier for the equally hard-line, East German party leader Walter Ulbricht to find common ground with him.[3]

Official West German foreign policy never raised the issue of changing the Czechoslovak border—that is, restoring the 1938 Munich Agreement. Nevertheless,

1 = = Sheldon Anderson, *A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish–East German Relations 1945–1962* (Westview Press, 2001), 40–46, 50–59, 259–76.

2 = = Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (Penguin Press, 2005), 270.

3 = = Anderson, *A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc*, 259–66.

Prague also feared West German territorial claims. This fear was justified at most by the activities of Sudeten German organizations operating in the FRG.[4] In any case, for the "northern tier" of the Warsaw Pact, the most important condition for normalizing relations with the FRG was the recognition of their borders. Therefore, Csaba Békés refers to the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as security-concerned states.[5] Paradoxically, these countries were never able to pursue a coordinated policy toward Bonn because their internal conflicts prevented them from doing so. Contemporary Western political scientists assumed that such an alliance existed between them, which they called the "iron triangle." However, per more recent sources, no such alliance emerged either in the 1950s or in 1967, when their friendship treaties were signed.[6]

= = = The Plan for a European Security Conference

The interests of security-concerned countries were primarily championed by the Warsaw Pact and, prior to its formation, by the Soviet Union. The means to achieve this was the European Security Conference (ESC), first proposed in November 1954 by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. The main reason for this was the October 23 decision made in Paris on the FRG's accession to NATO, which seriously threatened the security of the Eastern Bloc. However, Molotov did not invite the United States or Canada to the ESC, so other NATO countries did not want to attend either.[7] The Western military integration of West Germany could not be prevented. This was followed by the formation of the Warsaw Pact, which was originally a tactical maneuver: Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev tried to persuade the West to dissolve both military blocs in the spirit of détente, of course unsuccessfully.[8] The issue of the ESC did not arise in the following ten years.

Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the idea again at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1964.[9] In January 1965, the Political Con-

4 = = Jürgen Tampke, *Czech–German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe: From Bohemia to the EU* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 120–31.

5 = = Csaba Békés, *Hungary's Cold War: International Relations from the End of World War II to the Fall of the Soviet Union* (University of North Carolina Press, 2022), 184.

6 = = Douglas Selvage, "Papírháromszög: Lengyelország, az NDK és Csehszlovákia," [Paper Triangle: Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia] *Külpolitika* 7, no. 1–2. (2001): 168–76.

7 = = Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969* (Routledge, 2015), 21.

8 = = Vojtech Mastny, "The Warsaw Pact as History," in *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (CEU Press, 2005), 4–5.

9 = = Wanda Jarząbek, "Preserving the Status Quo or Promoting Change: The Role of the CSCE in the Perception of Polish Authorities," in *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe*, ed. Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (Berghahn, 2008), 145.

sultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact met in Warsaw. Its original agenda focused on NATO's plan to deploy nuclear weapons in West Germany under the name of Multilateral Forces (MLF). By the time the PCC convened, the issue had been removed from NATO's agenda. Ulbricht nevertheless wanted to keep the German question on the table. The only significant result of the contentious meeting was a Polish proposal that had not originally been on the agenda. Gomułka then revived Molotov's 1954 proposal and again proposed convening a European Security Conference. This was also accepted by the Romanians, and so it was included in the final declaration, albeit not very prominently.[10] From then on, the ESC was regularly on the agenda of subsequent PCC meetings of the Warsaw Pact, with the GDR and Poland being the main proponents of the idea.

Twenty years after the end of World War II, however, West German government policy began to change. In March 1966, Bonn sent a "peace note" to all Warsaw Pact member states except East Germany, proposing a bilateral treaty renouncing the use of force. The attempt to divide the camp was partly unsuccessful because the Poles, suffering from the "Rapallo complex,"[11] sent a harsh response. On the other hand, Romania and Hungary—this time along with reform-oriented Czechoslovakia—wanted to negotiate with the FRG, hoping for further improvement in their economic relations. Originally, the Soviets would have given a softer response, but at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in June 1966, Gomułka convinced Moscow, which also made recognition of the GDR and the Oder–Neisse border a precondition for negotiations.[12]

A month later, the PCC met in Bucharest. The Romanian hosts succeeded in getting the Warsaw Pact to tone down its official response to the West German peace note; the declaration did not condemn the FRG and left open the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn. The importance of convening the ESC was reiterated more emphatically than at the 1965 meeting in Warsaw—this time not as a Polish but as a Romanian–Soviet proposal. The appeal was essentially defensive in nature, so its reception in NATO states was not bad. Its weakness, however, was that it did not invite the United States and made recognition of the two German states and the existing borders a basic precondition. On this basis, the West was naturally unwilling to negotiate.[13] Romania, on the other hand, continued to

10 = = Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered*, 137–40.

11 = = Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty in 1922 in Rapallo, Italy, establishing a friendly relationship and ending diplomatic isolation. Moreover, both countries had territorial claims against Poland, which is why many consider Rapallo to be a precursor to the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.

12 = = Selvage, "Papírháromszög," 170–72; Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered*, 148–50.

13 = = Csaba Békés, "Magyarország és az európai biztonság előkészítése 1965–1970" [Hungary and the Preparations of European Security 1965–1970], in *Évkönyv XII.*

prepare for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG, which worried Warsaw and East Berlin.

In October 1966, Erhard's government fell in the FRG. A new grand coalition government was formed in Bonn in December under the leadership of Kurt Georg Kiesinger, while Willy Brandt became foreign minister. Brandt had already indicated on December 13, 1966, that he would put West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe on a new footing. This initiative became known as *Ostpolitik*, the (new) Eastern Policy of West Germany. While previous West German foreign policy regarded the European Security Conference as a serious threat, Brandt supported the plan of a European Security System (ESS), invented also by the Eastern Bloc. *Ostpolitik* was a step-by-step "master plan" that anticipated German reunification in the long term, although at first glance it seemed to serve Soviet interests and therefore faced serious internal opposition in West Germany.[14]

Brandt essentially broke with the Hallstein Doctrine but still did not recognize the GDR or the Oder–Neisse border. However, he was willing to establish full diplomatic relations with any socialist country other than the GDR. In addition to Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia also negotiated on this issue. At the same time, Ulbricht and Gomułka proposed convening a meeting of the Warsaw Pact members and managed to convince Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev that diplomatic relations with West Germany would only be possible if Bonn recognized the GDR, accepted the existing borders, and renounced nuclear weapons.[15] Then, in early 1967, Bucharest established diplomatic relations with West Germany without consulting its allies. The Polish and East German first secretaries reacted hysterically. On February 8–10, 1967, they forced the adoption of a secret protocol in Warsaw, which imposed six conditions on other countries for establishing relations with the FRG. This so-called "Warsaw Package" is referred to in the literature as the Ulbricht Doctrine, although it should in reality be called the Gomułka Doctrine or, according to Douglas Selvage, neither. The conditions were as follows: 1. The FRG must renounce the principle of "sole representation"; 2. It must recognize the GDR; 3. It must recognize the existing borders, including the Oder–Neisse line; 4. It must recognize the invalidity of the 1938 Munich Agreement; 5. It must renounce nuc-

Magyarország a jelenkorban [Yearbook XII. Hungary in the Contemporary Era], ed. Éva Standeisky and János Rainer M. (1956-os Intézet, 2004), 292; Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered*, 154–56.

14 = = Oliver Bange, "An Intricate Web: Ostpolitik, the European Security System and German Unification," in *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe*, ed. Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (Berghahn, 2008), 24–30.

15 = = Selvage, "Papírháromszög," 171–72.

lear weapons; 6. It must recognize West Berlin as an independent city-state—that is, not part of its own territory.[16]

In April 1967, the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties met in Karlovy Vary. Romania boycotted the meeting and did not sign the final declaration. The conference also made public the six conditions of the Warsaw Package, which had originally been secret, as conditions for convening the ESC. The meeting thus reemphasized the importance of holding the ESC, and Warsaw Pact member states had to convince their Western partners of the importance of the ESC in bilateral negotiations. This allowed the bloc's states to establish legal relations with the West, gain diplomatic experience, and emancipate themselves.[17] After that, relations with West Germany and the issue of the ESC reached a deadlock for two years. Of course, the Prague Spring and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty also played a role in this, diverting attention from the German question.

On March 17, 1969, the PCC of the Warsaw Pact met in Budapest. The meeting, which lasted only a few hours, was merely a formality, as important decisions had been made the day before. In addition to the organization's long-delayed military reform, the ESC issue was added to the agenda at the last minute, which the Hungarian side presented as its own proposal. Gomułka and Ulbricht were the most difficult to convince—they would have condemned the FRG and the West more strongly and continued to insist that the fulfilment of the Warsaw Package be a prerequisite for the ESC. Nicolae Ceauşescu and János Kádár, the Romanian and Hungarian party leaders, were only able to persuade them to be more realistic by joining forces. By this time, Brezhnev had also had enough of the Polish–East German blackmailing. It was against this backdrop that the Budapest Appeal was born, proposing the convening of the ESC without preconditions, thus making its actual implementation possible. In October 1969, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact declared in Prague that economic and trade cooperation with the West was also important. The Hungarian side proposed that the ESC should be a series of conferences or even a permanent organization.[18]

16 = = Douglas Selvage, "Poland, the GDR, and the 'Ulbricht Doctrine'," in *Ideology, Politics, and Diplomacy in East Central Europe*, ed. M. B. B. Biskupski (University of Rochester Press, 2003), 231–41; Wanda Jarząbek, "'Ulbricht-Doktrin' oder 'Gomułka-Doktrin'? Das Bemühen der Volksrepublik Polen um eine geschlossene Politik des kommunistischen Blocks gegenüber der westdeutschen Ostpolitik 1966/67" ["Ulbricht Doctrine" or "Gomułka Doctrine"? The People's Republic of Poland's Efforts to Achieve a Unified Policy of the Communist Bloc towards West Germany's Ostpolitik in 1966/67], *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 55, no. 1 (2006): 110–14.

17 = = Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered*, 159–63.

18 = = Békés, *Hungary's Cold War*, 241–52; Békés, "Magyarország és az Európai Biztonsági Értekezlet előkészítése," 296–301, 304–5.

= = = The FRG's Treaties with Eastern Europe (1970–1973): Respecting (the Inviolability of) Borders

In September 1969, the Social Democrats won the Bundestag elections in the FRG. For the first time, the conservative CDU (*Christlich Demokratische Union*) was forced into opposition. *Ostpolitik* gained new momentum during Chancellor Brandt's term (1969–1974). The first concrete result of this was the Soviet–West German treaty, which was signed on August 12, 1970. The parties renounced the use of force and declared that they would "respect" existing borders, with particular emphasis on the inner German border and the Oder–Neisse line. The Soviets renounced the formula of "recognition of borders," while the FRG indicated that it still aimed to achieve German unity, but only by peaceful means and exclusively through the unification of the FRG and the GDR.

In previous years, Poland had done everything in its power to hinder the improvement of relations between West Germany and the Soviet bloc. However, in 1969, this policy failed and Gomułka had to change his mind. The intervention against Czechoslovakia did not derail the détente, and Soviet–West German relations continued to improve. At the same time, Poland failed to persuade the GDR to engage in extensive economic cooperation with the Eastern Bloc. Although Ulbricht agreed to this in 1967, Günter Mittag, the chief architect of the GDR's new economic system (NÖS), sabotaged the signing of the agreement. Polish–East German relations cooled, and Gomułka "denounced" Ulbricht to Brezhnev because of the threat of German economic reunification. The Polish First Secretary then sought to integrate the GDR into the bloc by strengthening the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). At the end of 1968, Soviet–West German negotiations resumed, and the GDR also began talks with Bonn, during which it did not demand the recognition of the Oder–Neisse border. The two German states signed a long-term trade agreement, which aimed to increase intra-German trade nearly threefold in six years. Fearing German reunification, Gomułka told the Soviets that this could not go on. He considered the existence of the GDR to be even more important than Western recognition of the Oder–Neisse border. In April 1969, his plan for reforming the Comecon also failed, and the Polish leader changed his tactics, proposing negotiations with the FRG himself. At a Warsaw Pact summit in December 1969, Gomułka acknowledged that a decisive turning point had been reached in Bonn's policy, but Ulbricht opposed the negotiations.[19] Gomułka was also dissatisfied with the Budapest Appeal, which regarded the inviolability (rather than recognition) of borders as an important condition for European security. Therefore, Warsaw prepared its own draft for a future security conference in

19 = = Douglas Selvage, "The Treaty of Warsaw: The Warsaw Pact Context," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute – Supplement* 1 (2003): 69–75.

September 1969 which contained a *recognition* of borders. However, the Soviets did not support it, as they believed that the West would find it unacceptable.[20]

It was against this backdrop that Polish–West German talks began in February 1970. After seven rounds of negotiations, the treaty was signed in Warsaw on December 7, 1970. The opposition—the CDU/CSU and Silesian refugee organizations—continuously attacked Brandt's government during this time. Signatories agreed that Poland's western border would run along the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers and reaffirmed the inviolability of the existing borders. They renounced the use of force. The FRG asked the Poles to improve the situation of the German minority and to allow their emigration for the purpose of family reunification, which Warsaw promised (although not in the text of the treaty). The signing and subsequent ratification of the treaty did not mean the establishment of diplomatic relations.[21]

Immediately after the Soviet–West German treaty, the PCC met in Moscow in August. Ceaușescu believed that other Eastern Bloc countries could also establish relations with the FRG, but his proposal was rejected. In December, there was another PCC meeting in Berlin. By then, the signing of the Polish–West German treaty was imminent. Gomułka secretly agreed with Brezhnev that Warsaw would then be able to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn, although only two of the six demands made in 1967 were met. (The FRG joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969—that is, it agreed not to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory—and it reaffirmed the inviolability of borders in 1970). The reason for the deal was to compensate Brandt, as the chancellor was facing serious internal and external difficulties. The conditions for the other states remained unchanged.[22]

The Warsaw Pact states achieved a significant success on September 3, 1971. A Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was signed by the victorious powers of 1945, stating that West Berlin was not legally part of the FRG. However, Bonn could represent the city in international organizations and provide consular protection to its residents. The treaty referred to the existence of the GDR, so by signing it, the Western powers recognized the GDR for the first time (though the FRG still did not).[23]

A Warsaw Pact summit took place in Crimea at the end of July 1972. Brezhnev changed his mind here and again forbade the Poles from establishing diplo-

20 = = Jarząbek, "Preserving the Status Quo," 147–48.

21 = = Claus Hofhansel, *Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy and Central Europe* (Routledge, 2005), 32–36.

22 = = Csaba Békés, "Magyarország, a szovjet blokk, a német kérdés és az európai biztonság 1967–1975" [Hungary, the Soviet Bloc, the German Question, and the European Security 1967–1975], in *Évkönyv XVI. Kádárizmus: mélyfúrások* [Yearbook XVI. Kádárism: Dig Deep], ed. János Tischler (1956-os Intézet, 2009), 330–31.

23 = = M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente & Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 113–23.

matic relation with the FRG. Nevertheless, due to another special agreement, Poland was authorized to do so in September.[24]

On December 21, 1972, the German–German Basic Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*) was signed. Prior to this, two agreements (the Transit Accord in December 1971 and the Traffic Treaty in May 1971) were signed, whereby the FRG recognized the existence of the GDR for the first time. In the Basic Treaty, the parties renounced the use of force and "reaffirm[ed] the inviolability [*Unverletzlichkeit*] of the border between them now and in the future."[25] The phrase "recognition of the borders" did not appear in the text either. It was highlighted that neither party could represent the other state, thereby renouncing the principle of "sole representation" of Germany by the FRG. The FRG indicated in a letter that it would not renounce its plan for the peaceful reunification of Germany. The FRG continued to adhere to the principle in its Basic Law that all German citizens were also citizens of the FRG, while the GDR wanted to recognize independent citizenship. A compromise was reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Instead of ambassadors, the two countries sent "permanent representatives" to each other's capitals. Consequently, the two German states were admitted to the UN at the same time in September 1973.[26] After the signing of the December 1972 treaty, only one of the six conditions of the 1967 Warsaw Package remained unfulfilled: the declaration of the invalidity of the Munich Agreement.

Signing such a declaration was accompanied by unexpected difficulties, although Bonn never wanted to revise the German–Czechoslovak border. Prague insisted that Munich was invalid from the beginning (*ex tunc*). For the FRG, *ex tunc* was unacceptable, since in that case the Sudeten Germans would have been Czechoslovak citizens throughout the war, and could therefore have been rightly accused of treason and deported after 1945. Bonn wanted the Munich Agreement to be declared invalid *ex nunc* (literally "from now on": i.e., from a date later than 1938). Finally, a compromise was reached between the parties, and the invalidity was declared in such a way that neither the German (*nichtig*) nor the Czech (*nulitný*) words clearly indicated since when Munich had been invalid. Lawyers analyzed the entire text and concluded that it contained elements of both *ex tunc* and *ex nunc*. The treaty was finally signed on December 11, 1973, declaring that both parties

24 = = Békés, *"Magyarország, a szovjet blokk, a német kérdés és az európai biztonság,"* 338–39.

25 = = For the German text of the treaty, see DocumentArchiv, "Grundlagenvertrag" (December 21, 1972), http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/grundlvertr.html. Quote taken from Artikel 3.

26 = = Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil*, 123–60.

"reaffirm the inviolability of their common border now and in the future."[27] At the same time that the two countries established diplomatic relations, Bulgaria and Hungary have now followed suit.

= = = From ESC to CSCE and the Conclusion of Security Issues in Helsinki

In February 1970, US President Richard Nixon acknowledged the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's security concerns, and in May, a statement issued at the NATO meeting in Rome explicitly referred to the need for a security conference. In June 1970, in Budapest, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact accepted two important Western demands: firstly, that the US and Canada should participate as full members in the future ESC, and secondly, that in addition to security and economic cooperation issues, which had already been supported by the Eastern Bloc, a third topic—cultural cooperation and the investigation of the human environment—should be added to the agenda. At the meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Warsaw in November–December 1971, the main goal was to speed up preparations for the ESC, or, more precisely, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as it was already called also in the Eastern Bloc. Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter considered it important that the CSCE should involve independent states rather than blocs. In January 1972, the PCC was held in Prague. A new call was made for the CSCE, and, accepting a Finnish proposal, delegates were sent to Helsinki for a preparatory meeting. Preparations indeed accelerated, and Hungarian foreign policy played an important role in this. In January 1973, the deputy foreign ministers met in Moscow. They agreed to divide the CSCE cooperation issues into two sub-topics at the request of the West: economic, scientific, and technical cooperation on the one hand, and cultural cooperation, including the exchange of people and information, on the other. Therefore, the important "third basket" had finally taken shape. János Péter was already afraid that the West would take the initiative, so he proposed that the Eastern Bloc act in a coordinated manner.[28]

The first meeting of the CSCE began in Helsinki on July 3, 1973, and negotiations continued in Geneva for nearly two years. Finally, the closing conference and ceremonial signing took place again in the Finnish capital in the summer of 1975. The conference came to represent the apogee of détente and, according to many, was a substitute for the German peace treaty that had not been concluded after 1945. As one of the American diplomats noted, "all of the delegates at the Conference

27 = = Tampke, *Czech–German Relations*, 132–37. For the German text of the treaty, see DocumentArchiv, "Prager Vertrag" (December 11, 1973), http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/cssr1973.html. Quote taken from Artikel 4.

28 = = Békés, "Magyarország és az európai biztonság előkészítése," 307–8; Békés, "Magyarország, a szovjet blokk, a német kérdés és az európai biztonság," 332–33, 342–43; Békés, *Hungary's Cold War*, 254–56.

realized that the CSCE was, in fact, about Germany."[29] By then, the security issues demanded by the Eastern Bloc had already been resolved by the Eastern treaties concluded between West Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. These security-related topics formed the so-called first basket of the CSCE. Nevertheless, the Soviets believed that it would be "preferable" to enshrine the inviolability of borders in a multilateral treaty. The GDR, however, had even greater ambitions; at first, they sought to establish the immutability of borders at the conference. When this failed, their next goal was to make the principle of inviolability of borders an "essential" requirement at the conference. Keeping it as an independent fundamental principle was of paramount importance to the GDR. Western states, especially West Germany, would have liked the basic principles of the Final Act to refer to the possibility of peaceful border changes, but they had to give up on this. Instead of the ten Fundamental Principles—the so-called Decalogue of the Final Act—only the first chapter, entitled "Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty" referred to it[30] as follows: "The participating States [...] consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement."[31] This compromise was reached after nearly a year of struggle (April 1974 to March 1975), and it is no exaggeration to say that the success of the entire CSCE depended on whether the possibility of peaceful border change could be included in the Final Act. The change of government in Bonn in May 1974 did not cause any disruption in this regard. The new Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt and his foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, continued the *Ostpolitik* pursued by Brandt and Walter Scheel. Genscher firmly stated that no German government would sign the Final Act without resolving the issue satisfactorily. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger played a major role in the solution, even though he considered the West German demand to be an annoying nuisance.[32] We can conclude that—contrary to the statement of East German leader Erich Honecker—"the final division of Germany"[33] was *not* sanctioned. The Final Act did not contain any reference to the *immutability* of borders—which was the ultimate goal of the

29 = = Quoted in Gottfried Niedhart, "Peaceful Change of Frontiers as a Crucial Element in the West German Strategy of Transformation," in *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe*, ed. Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (Berghahn, 2008), 43.

30 = = Federica Caciagli, "The GDR's targets in the early CSCE process: Another missed opportunity to freeze the division of Germany, 1969–73," in *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75*, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (Routledge, 2008), 117–18.

31 = = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act of the CSCE (August 1, 1975), 4, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf.

32 = = Niedhart, "Peaceful Change of Frontiers," 43–49.

33 = = Quoted in Edwina N. Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Détente* (Westview Press, 1978), 220.

GDR—only to their *inviolability*. In short, German reunification in 1990 was made possible already in Helsinki. This was an unfavorable turn for Poland, whose main goal was to prevent German unification. Warsaw protested the principle of peaceful border changes, but to no avail. However, Poland was basically satisfied with the results achieved in Helsinki.[34]

Still, Helsinki's significance lay more in cooperation, with economic cooperation forming the second basket and humanitarian and cultural cooperation forming the third.

= = = Permeability of Borders Before Helsinki

The right to free movement became a basic human right after World War II, although it was accepted only in the Free World. "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," concluded the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948.[35] This was strengthened by the European Convention on Human Rights (1950): more precisely, by its Protocol No. 4, signed in 1963. No Eastern Bloc states were among their signatories. However, in the late 1960s, they joined United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which also stated that "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own," and "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."[36] In fact, the right to free movement was guaranteed only in Western countries. The 1947 Geneva Passport Conference recommended abolition of visas based on bilateral agreements and the introduction of rapid border control procedures. Already during the 1950s, even passport-free zones were established (Benelux states; Scandinavia; the British Isles). After the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957, citizens of member states were entitled to travel without passport, although border checks were not eliminated and ID cards were required. Consequently, the permeability of borders within Western

34 = = Wanda Jarząbek, *Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964–1989* (CWIHP Working Paper 56, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008), 38–44.

35 = = UN General Assembly, Resolution 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217(III) (December 10, 1948), https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

36 = = UN General Assembly, Resolution 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/2200(XXI) (December 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.

Europe increased, but immigration controls at external borders have become more stringent.[37]

The situation was quite different in the Soviet camp. Until the death of Stalin, borders were almost completely sealed, including borders between "fraternal" states. Foreign travel was possible only in the public interest. From 1955, the Soviets initiated reforms within the whole bloc. However, there were significant differences among countries in the implementation of these reforms. Hungary and Poland liberalized their border regimes, although at different rates and with minor setbacks. In certain periods, especially during the 1960s, other states like Czechoslovakia and Romania followed suit. Reform-oriented states allowed their citizens relatively free travel abroad. Hardline states, however, only allowed it even within the bloc from the 1960s or 1970s. For this reason, visa-free travel between socialist countries only became possible at this time. Yugoslavia, which was excluded from the bloc, was the only country that fully allowed travel to the West from the 1960s onwards. Apart from letting or forcing unwanted elements—minorities or dissidents—to emigrate, Western travel was very limited in other states. Of course, the restrictions were much less severe in Hungary and Poland. These limitations were mainly justified on grounds of state security, but economic and financial considerations also played a role. Another important lesson is that the bloc countries also restricted travel between themselves for financial reasons, as they were unable to secure even Eastern, non-convertible currency supplies. In other cases, the aim was to curb shopping tourism, which caused shortages of goods and, in some cases, serious budgetary damage, as price subsidies intended for domestic consumers were also taken advantage of by foreigners. Finally, in times of crisis, such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, or the Polish Solidarity movement that began in 1980, neighboring "fraternal" states introduced significant restrictions.[38] The most liberal border regime appeared in Hungary. Détente played a significant role in this even before 1975, and Austria's contribution was of outstanding importance. On the one hand, Austria was Hungary's gateway to the West, and on the other, Vienna constantly pressed for the liberalization of the Hungarian border regime. Many Austrian proposals, such as opening of new border crossing stations, the reintroduction of local border traffic, the complete dismantling of the Iron Curtain, and introduction of visa-free travel, did not (yet) come

37 = = Péter Bencsik, *Border Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe* (Routledge, 2022), 71, 74–76.

38 = = Bencsik, *Border Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe*, 94–113; Péter Bencsik "Emigration Policy of the East Central European State Socialist Regimes, 1945–1989," *Arhivele Totalitarismului* 32, no. 3–4 (2024): 93–107.

to fruition at that time. The partial results were nevertheless significant: facilitation of visa issuance was achieved in 1968, and demining of the common border was finished by 1971.[39]

= = = The Helsinki Final Act and the Permeability of Borders After 1975

The Helsinki Final Act was—among others—an appeal for freer travel, with the emphasis on "freer." Instead of insisting on complete freedom of movement, Bonn convinced its Western partners that a policy of small steps could lead to more certain success. The demand for complete freedom of movement would probably have been rejected by the Eastern Bloc countries, primarily the GDR; Bonn feared that in this case the issue might even be removed from the CSCE agenda.[40] Therefore, the phrasing of the Final Act was as follows:

"The participating States [...] Make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States [...]

The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons and to this end they intend in particular:

– gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry;

– to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory, with due regard to security requirements.

They will endeavour gradually to lower, where necessary, the fees for visas and official travel documents. [...]

The participating States consider that tourism contributes to a fuller knowledge of the life, culture and history of other countries, to the growth of understanding among peoples, to the improvement of contacts and to the broader use of leisure. They intend to promote the development of tourism, on an individual or collective basis, and, in particular, they intend:

39 = = Maximilian Graf, "The opening of the Austrian–Hungarian border revisited: How European détente contributed to overcoming the 'Iron Curtain'," in *New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War: Unexpected Transformations?*, ed. Bernhard Blumenau, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, and Barbara Zanchetta (Routledge, 2018), 140–43.

40 = = Petri Hakkarainen, "From Linkage to Freer Movement: The FRG and the Nexus between Western CSCE Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–72," in *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75*, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (Routledge, 2008), 172–78.

– to promote visits to their respective countries by encouraging the provision of appropriate facilities and the simplification and expediting of necessary formalities relating to such visits."[41]

While the regulations of Western countries had been fully in line with the above, Eastern Bloc states had a lot of work to do. The Soviets were shocked by the idea of free movement of ideas and people. In 1974, Brezhnev told French President Georges Pompidou that these Western proposals "have no relation whatsoever with questions of sovereignty, of the inviolability of frontiers."[42] The hesitant Politburo was convinced by diplomat Anatoly Kovalev with the support of KBG leader Yuri Andropov, who believed that concessions should be made on paper only.[43] It is important to emphasize that the Helsinki Final Act was not legally binding, and in case of human rights objections from the West, Eastern Bloc countries could refer to Principle 6 of the Decalogue, which was about non-intervention in internal affairs (previously drafted by the Soviets as "non-interference," a more restrictive phrase).[44]

Daniel Thomas was the first to formulate the theory of the "Helsinki effect," which has been adopted by many other scholars. It means that human rights commitments signed in Helsinki undermined communist rule in East-Central Europe, as they triggered the formation of dissident groups that forced communist governments to comply with these promises.[45] More recent studies underline that Western human rights campaign had very little effect on the demise of communism. Robert Brier emphasizes that dissident movements in the Eastern Bloc were not created by the Helsinki process, and that their role was almost negligible in the fall of communism. For instance, these movements were easily crushed by the KBG in the Soviet Union. Western politicians had little hope in them; consequently, they refrained from supporting them and/or thought that doing so would be counterproductive. It was mainly Western human rights activism—that is, social movements—which expressed greater solidarity with them. In fact, these movements fought against political elites both in the West and the East, feeling that the "power and influence of these elites were based on sustaining the conflict

41 = = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act of the CSCE (August 1, 1975), 38–41, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf.

42 = = Quoted by Marie-Pierre Rey, "The USSR and the Helsinki process, 1969–75: Optimism, doubt or defiance?" in *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75*, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (Routledge, 2008), 77.

43 = = Rey, "The USSR and the Helsinki process," 77–78.

44 = = Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 61.

45 = = Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*. See esp. 257–88.

between East and West; controlling political institutions and draining all economic energies for the arms build-up, these elites were thus seen as driving the societies of East and West toward self-extermination."[46] Douglas Selvage shares a similar opinion, also emphasizing that the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and even Poland successfully repressed their dissident movements until 1982. Still, the Helsinki effect entered into force from 1982 due to the economic weakness of state socialist countries. Without loans from and trade with the West they were threatened by bankruptcy. Among the first concessions was a more liberal emigration policy in the Soviet Union and East Germany. Military détente (i.e., disarmament) was another— albeit also economically motivated—reason behind Soviet concessions. During the 1980s, the only option that prevented the "Helsinki effect" was economic self-sufficiency and re-Stalinization, which only Romania attempted.[47] However, another analysis suggests that Czechoslovakia was not far behind Romania in terms of the severity and inhumanity of its border regime.[48] Most of these Western critiques focused on human rights in general (Principle 7 of the Helsinki Declaration, technically within the first basket) and not on the role of the third basket. However, Csaba Békés explicitly concludes that the effect of the third basket is overestimated, while the second basket had much larger consequences; according to him, economic dependence and indebtedness contributed to the collapse of the Eastern regimes.[49]

An in-depth analysis of the Helsinki follow-up conferences shows that third basket issues were of great importance in Belgrade (1977–1978) and in Madrid (1980–1983). The Hungarian leadership constantly monitored Western intentions and adjusted its own actions accordingly. In fact, Budapest not only adopted a defensive stance, but also emphasized its greater openness compared to the West in many areas of humanitarian cooperation. The Belgrade meeting ended in a stalemate; only Hungary—the country that best met the Helsinki criteria from the out-

46 = = Robert Brier, "Beyond the 'Helsinki Effect': East European Dissent and the Western Left in the 'Long 1970s'," in *The 'Long 1970s': Human Rights, East-West Détente, and Transnational Relations*, ed. Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager, and Helle Porsdam (Routledge, 2016), 71–75, 82.

47 = = Douglas Selvage, "The Limits of Repression: Soviet Bloc Security Services vs. Transnational Helsinki Networks, 1976–1986," in *The CSCE and the End of The Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, ed. Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (Berghahn, 2019), 212–19.

48 = = Maximilian Graf, "European Détente and the CSCE: Austria and the East-Central European Theatre in the 1970s and 1980s," in *The CSCE and the End of The Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, ed. Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (Berghahn, 2019), 260–62.

49 = = Csaba Békés, "Détente and the Soviet Bloc: From Promoter to Victim, 1975–91," in *The 'Long 1970s': Human Rights, East-West Détente, and Transnational Relations*, ed. Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager, and Helle Porsdam (Routledge, 2016), 165–67.

set—took significant steps, already then for economic reasons. Still, the third basket was listed as a potential threat also in official Hungarian documents in 1978. However, the whole Eastern Bloc was forced to make significant concessions in Madrid.[50]

In the case of hard-line states, the Helsinki effect only came to real fruition in the 1980s. Stephan Kieninger suggests that economic and humanitarian issues were interlinked: "Trade was a lever to perforate the Iron Curtain and to conduct détente in dynamic ways."[51] Following the policy of small steps taken already by Brandt, Helmut Schmidt could "buy" the freer movement of West Germans to the GDR and the possibility of emigration of Germans from various Eastern countries. Consequently, Schmidt opposed the trade war policy of Carter. He was even willing to grant a five-billion-mark loan to East Berlin to convince Erich Honecker for a more liberal exit policy. After Helmut Kohl became chancellor, only a billion-mark loan was negotiated and agreed to in 1983, in a strictly confidential way. Although no direct contract was signed for a "freer movement in return for cash" agreement, East Germans made some concessions, the most important among them being the dismantling of the automatic shooting devices along the inner German border, which was completed in November 1984. The West German move was bold, as they paid in advance without any guarantees, and the contract did not restrict how the money should be used. The main West German negotiator, Franz-Joseph Strauß expected that the border checks—or, rather, harassments—would be eased for Western tourists entering the GDR, and these incidents indeed significantly decreased. A new cross-border postal agreement was also reached in 1983. Not all questions could be solved, though. For example, West Germany campaigned in vain for lowering the East German age limit for travel. As dissent grew in East Germany, however, more and more people tried—and succeeded—to seek asylum in Western embassies in early 1984, forcing the GDR to permit a further 40,000 people to emigrate legally. Kieninger concludes that the *Milliardenkredit* saved the GDR from insolvency in the short run but contributed to its collapse in the long run.[52] According to Federica Caciagli, "...the GDR hoped to protect its boundaries. Yet, the GDR had in fact opened them up when it had

50 = = Róbert Takács, "Hungarian Foreign Policy and Basket III in the Cold War Confrontation from Helsinki to Madrid," *Múltunk* 64, no. 5 [special edition] (2019): 61–82, 93–106.

51 = = Stephan Kieninger, "Freer movement in return for cash: Franz Josef Strauß Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, and the Milliardenkredit for the GDR, 1983–1984," in *New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War: Unexpected Transformations?*, ed. Bernhard Blumenau, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, and Barbara Zanchetta (Routledge, 2018), 117.

52 = = Kieninger, "Freer movement in return for cash," 126–29.

underestimated the importance of the third basket and had instead almost totally focused on the first one."[53]

Until 1989, selective emigration was a useful tool for East Berlin. With this so-called "targeted safety valve," opposition movements were weakened, as the regime itself could select the most active dissidents. The method was as follows: applicants were first denied, testing their determination. Many applicants were punished or harassed. If they repeatedly applied for emigration and even engaged in oppositional activities, they were more likely to be authorized to leave. A significant percentage of applicants was rejected to reduce the loss of human capital. Highly skilled experts of great economic importance were less likely to receive authorization to emigrate.[54]

The Austrian–Hungarian border quickly became more permeable after Helsinki. Austria was willing to invest significant amounts in the development of the Hungarian tourist industry; in return, a fifth border crossing station opened in 1976 in Bucsu, and in 1978, an agreement was reached on visa-free tourist traffic between the two countries. Although Austria and Poland had already abolished visa requirements in 1972, this was still a more significant step, as it was agreed between two neighboring countries. Border stations were refurbished with Austrian loans. Vienna urged speeding up border checks and encouraged the possibility of more frequent trips even for Hungarian tourists. The main obstacle to the latter was the shortage of hard currency. This was also the reason why the Hungarian side refused to allow local border traffic. Still, Austria kept pushing her demands during the following years. Finally, in 1987, the Hungarian side decided that instead of a local border traffic agreement, travel to the West should be liberalized in general. This led to the introduction of the "world passport," valid for all countries of the world without a need for an exit visa, which had previously been compulsory. Although there is no evidence that this step was related to another billion-mark loan (which Hungary received from West Germany in 1987), an indirect connection is conceivable. In any case, after the introduction of the world passport, the complete dismantling of the technically obsolete Iron Curtain was a logical step, which contributed not only to the ultimate downfall of the Hungarian regime, but also to that of East Germany.[55]

53 = = Caciagli, "The GDR's targets," 119.

54 = = Julian Michel, Michael K. Miller, and Margaret E. Peters, "How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates: Evidence from East Germany," *International Organization* 77, Summer (2023): 531–40.

55 = = Graf, "The opening of the Austrian–Hungarian border revisited," 144–52; Bencsik, *Border Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe*, 104, 115.

= = = Conclusion

The development of state socialist countries generally moved from closed but uncertain borders to guaranteed but more open borders. However, it cannot be said that this uncertainty was the main reason for the closed borders, nor, vice versa, that the opening of the borders was a consequence of declaring them inviolable. The main reason for the isolation was the adoption of the Soviet model, with strict border regimes that included building the Iron Curtain. Although propaganda often claimed that the Iron Curtain served to ward off the imperialist threat, in reality it was intended to prevent the population of Eastern European countries from fleeing. However, the "northern tier" of the bloc was indeed in danger, and the Poles and East Germans successfully forced their allies to take joint action against the FRG. Although their real goal was the *recognition*—or *immutability*—of borders, they had to be content with an international declaration of the *inviolability* of borders. This was still a significant success for them, but they had to pay a heavy price for it. In a sense, the Helsinki Conference was unnecessary for them, as they did not achieve anything more than what the Bonn government had already guaranteed them in the Eastern Treaties. What is more, they had to accept that human rights and humanitarian cooperation, including border permeability, should also be subject to negotiation. Apparently, Principle 7 (on human rights) and the third basket (on freer movement) on their own did not weaken communist regimes, especially in the short term. Only the second basket (on economic cooperation) and the resulting indebtedness made this possible. However, the second basket alone would not have been sufficient either. It was the combined effect of the second and third baskets, as well as the Soviet Union's overextension and overspending, that caused the collapse of the communist systems. It is worth noting that while dissident movements focused on the implementation of Principle 7, concessions made due to Western economic blackmail almost exclusively concerned the third basket. Although freer travel is itself a human rights issue, and thus these two topics are interconnected, general human rights are often mistakenly classified as belonging to the third basket in the literature.

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Keywords

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Helsinki, Hotel Vaakuna, 1977.

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/// The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 1975) and Its Meaning to Finland and Hungary Revisited

Abstract

In this paper, an attempt is made to show why and how the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was conceived and convened in Helsinki in 1975, how it became a means for Finland to pursue a pragmatic but active policy of neutrality, and what it meant to Hungary in the demanding circumstances of the Cold War. In this connection, an opportunity is also taken to compare what President Kekkonen and General Secretary János Kádár thought about it and how they evaluated the CSCE summit and its results. The source material of this short study consists of archival sources, historical studies of the Cold War, contemporary commentary, and memoirs. The approach in the study is combined political history (the history of foreign policy) and the history of political ideas. It should be realized that this paper does not purport to give a comprehensive narrative of the topic, but rather an overview of the policies, adopted in an atmosphere of détente, which created the circumstances for an exceptional international venue for discussing and deciding on matters of European security and cooperation.

In this article I attempt to show why and how the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was conceived and convened in Helsinki in 1975, how it became a means for Finland to pursue a pragmatic but active policy of neutrality, and what it meant to Hungary in the demanding circumstances of the Cold War. In this connection, I also take the opportunity to compare what President Kekkonen and General Secretary János Kádár thought about it and how they evaluated the CSCE summit and its results. In doing this I complement the history of

diplomacy with the history of political ideas.[1] What comes to the historiography of the theme, it was not properly studied before the Kádár-Kekkonen Project financed by the Academy of Finland (2002–2005), the results of which are shown in the text and notes.

One crucial precondition for the realization of the CSCE must be mentioned at the outset. Namely, the development of international *détente* in the 1970s created a situation with which to settle the nagging dilemma of Germany; the two Germanies finally recognized each other, and Finland recognized both. This solution paved the way for a new opportunity to call for a European security conference, which the Soviet Union had been trying in vain to bring about since the 1950s. KGB officer and diplomat Viktor Vladimirov, who had been stationed intermittently at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki since the 1960s, recalls in his memoirs that the Soviets made several requests to persuade Finland to initiate a pan-European conference of this kind, but President Kekkonen[2] had feared it might compromise his country's neutrality and had objected.[3] Furthermore, at the time, all European states could not yet have participated. For Kekkonen, who was an autocrat in foreign policy matters in Finland,[4] it was at least as important to signal to the West that Finland was a neutral state as it was to point out to the Soviets that, although Finland was a trustworthy neighbor of the Soviet Union, it could not comply with such a proposal that could harm its credibility and was unfeasible.[5] In Finnish-Soviet bilateral relations, Finland's policy of neutrality was registered in a paragraph of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance from 1948, but

1 = = Anssi Halmesvirta, *Aatehistorian harjoitus* (*History of Ideas in Practice*) (Jyväskylän Yliopisto, 2012).

2 = = Urho Kaleva Kekkonen (1900–1986), often referred to by his initials UKK, was a Finnish politician who served as the eighth and longest-serving President of Finland from 1956 to 1982. He also served as Prime Minister (1950–1953, 1954–1956) and held various other cabinet positions. He was the third Chairman of the Agrarian League/Centre Party. Serving as the head of state for nearly twenty-six years, he dominated Finnish politics for thirty-one years. Holding a large amount of power and prestige, he won elections with little opposition mainly because he had "friendly" relations with the Soviet leadership.

3 = = Viktor Vladimirov, *Näin se oli… Muistelmia ja havaintoja kulissientakaisesta diplomaattitoiminnasta Suomessa 1954–1984* (Otava, 1993), 53.

4 = = The wisdom of democracy is that from a democratic process can follow a non-democratic result. A majority elected by normal general elections can overrule minorities or lead a country through a democratic process even to a sort of autocracy if one person is regarded as irreplaceable—as was the case in Finland, when most of the parties supported Kekkonen from 1956 on. He was invincible in presidential elections and according to the constitution, he was responsible for foreign policy. The situation changed only after his death in 1982. Presidential powers were gradually reduced.

5 = = Max Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös* [Closing of the Books] (Otava, 2003), 64.

internationally the idea of Finland being a neutral country no longer caused too much trouble with the Soviets.

= = = Why Helsinki? Kekkonen's Initiative and the Hungarian Assistance

When in April 1969 the Soviet Union again proposed to all European states that they should make the necessary preparations for convening a security conference, the Finnish government surprised all concerned by offering on May 5, 1969 to organize it without preconditions. How was this possible? In the West at least, it would have given the impression that Finland was acting as the Soviet Union's proxy.[6]

East-West relations had been changing to such an extent with détente that the Kekkonen initiative could be expected to succeed, although his closest advisers could hardly believe it.[7] A proposal was sent to every European state and to two of the most influential NATO members, the USA and Canada. Finland offered not only to take responsibility for the inter-governmental consultations over the conference preparations, but to host the security conference itself, if this was deemed appropriate. In principle, the CSCE process was designed to bring stability and peace to Europe. It seemed acceptable to every European nation, and Hungary strongly supported Finland along the way.[8] However, the reality was that the Soviets desired to maintain and increase their influence in and over Europe, whereas NATO wished to secure Western Europe's position so that there would be no fear of aggression from the Soviets. Nevertheless, these realities also made it possible for the Finnish initiative to be received favorably, and the consultation process began before the end of 1969. The acceptance of Helsinki as the venue was further confirmed by the moral support of the decision, made by the USA and the Soviet Union, to organize the first round of their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki in November–December of the same year.[9]

Finland's Ambassador to the United Nations, Max Jakobson, who had prepared the proposal to host both the security conference and the SALT talks, cherished a long-standing ambition to become the next UN Secretary-General, the

6 = = For the image of Kekkonen in the West, see Vesa Vares, "Foes Who Grew Better in Time: The Image of Janos Kadar and Urho Kekkonen in the West from 1956 to the End of the 1960's," in *Kádár's Hungary – Kekkonen's Finland*, Hungarologische Beiträge 14, ed. Anssi Halmesvirta (University of Jyväskylä – Kopi-Jyvä, 2002), 15–56.

7 = = Juha Pohjonen, "In Kekkonen and Kádár We Trust," in *Bridge Building and Political Cultures: Hungary and Finland 1956-1989*, Hungarologische Beiträge 18, eds. Anssi Halmesvirta and Heino Nyyssönen (University of Jyväskylä –Kopi-Jyvä, 2006), 123.

8 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1967/37/44-142. Sándor Kurtán's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 7, 1967.

9 = = Jukka Nevakivi, "From the Continuation War to the Present, 1944–1999," in *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: A Political History of Finland since 1809*, eds. Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä, and Jukka Nevakivi (Hurst & Company, 1999), 312.

prerequisite for which was that Finland's initiative/proposal should have the support of the two superpowers. In the event, Jakobson's candidacy failed due to Soviet opposition, but the initiative for the security congress went through. Even the NATO powers finally accepted it on the condition that the conference agenda would include not only principles governing inter-state relations—notably a ban on the use of force—but also the development of international relations with a view to achieving greater freedom of movement of ideas and people, human rights issues, exchange of information, and cooperation in culture, economy, technology, science and environmental protection. The planned congress became known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

At this point, it may not go amiss to have a look at how the Finnish political aims behind the initiative were received and interpreted in Hungary. They were reflected in an article in *Népszabadság* on September 23, 1969, just before Kekkonen's first official state visit to Hungary. It was an extensive and quite well-studied summary of Kekkonen's public speeches and announcements on Finnish foreign policy by István L. Szabó who, according to my scant information, was the Director of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry. Harking back to history, Szabó emphasized that Finnish foreign policy was now entirely different compared to what it had been in the 1920s and 1930s, when the basic line had been to remain aloof from Great Power conflicts. Finland had been quite isolated, left alone to face Soviet aggression in the Winter War. Now, in the times of détente, Finland's position had changed drastically and everything that happened in the world was also its concern. Szabó designated this new line as "positive" foreign policy, meaning that every conflict between East and West was a test of Finland's neutrality, whereas before the wars, isolated Finland could only remain "negative" (my wording), without any possibility of making an impact on the affairs of Europe. Szabó opined that Kekkonen's policy line—basically, the realization of the fact that there was always the Soviet Union, the security interests of which Finland had to respect—tied Finland's destiny to the question of peace and its promotion. The suggestions of creating nuclear arms-free zones were concrete evidence of this policy. This novel feature in Finnish foreign policy showed its "positiveness" (*pozitivum*: based on an understanding of the geopolitical facts)—and it could succeed with the CSCE initiative because Kekkonen was highly appreciated both in the East and West as its formulator.[10] It is worth mentioning that Kekkonen himself had de-

10 = = From a synopsis of a press release from *Népszabadság*, September 23, 1969 (UMA 94 B), and from other experts on Finnish foreign policy: Mikola Rezső, "A Finn semlegesség néhany fontosabb sajatossága" and Hajdu Gyula, "Semlegesség a hidegháborúban" (HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-l-k-Finn/1963/5/12). It was realized that the Soviet trust in Finns was "a question of life and death" (*létfontosságu*) for the Finns.

scribed his foreign policy as not positive but "active" in the late 1960s.[11] If I dare to compare Szabó's and Kekkonen's characterizations, I will suggest that "positive" may even be an understatement because "positiveness" does not *necessarily* imply activities in the foreign political arena. Szabó's statements were otherwise quite accurate, especially when he referred to the reason why Kekkonen hoped for success from the CSCE: he wanted Finland to become recognized worldwide as a fully independent, neutral country which was not controlled remotely from Moscow. There had been suspicions that symptoms of Finlandization could be detected also in the CSCE initiative. Szabó concluded that Finland's new policy was welcomed by the Hungarians, and immediately after receiving the initiative, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted an analysis of the benefits the Eastern bloc could and would gain from the conference. Firstly, because the original idea came from the Soviets, it would increase the influence of the Eastern bloc in pan-European matters, and secondly, it would impinge on the unity of NATO and Western countries in general.[12]

Behind the scenes, the Soviets had pressured Finland for weeks on the matter, and the Hungarians had made proposals to the same effect in order to enhance the role of the socialist countries from the outset.[13] During the official talks between Kádár and Kekkonen on September 29, 1969, Kádár reminded Kekkonen that it had actually been the Advisory Board of the Warsaw Pact which had published the call for a security conference and thanked Kekkonen for a very "positive echo" in realizing that it had not been given with propagandist goals. Kekkonen emphasized that he had had to revise the call into a proposal which could be accepted by the NATO countries. Kádár was also "positive," suggesting that the conference could be convened in a couple of years' time after preparatory negotiations that would resolve the easier concrete questions and then proceed to deal with the difficult ones. Optimistically, he foresaw that within ten to fifteen years the most burning problems of European security could be solved. He asked Kekkonen to do all in his power to make the conference happen. Kekkonen answered that he would approach the Western powers after the NATO Council Meeting and talk about the

11 = = Urho Kekkonen, *Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka: Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkosen turvallisuuspoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943–1979* (Otava, 1982). It has become a cliché to say that too-active foreign policy is dangerous; Finland should not be too active, nor attract too much attention. It is rather better to keep a low profile to avoid demands from outside.

12 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-l-001386. Attachment on European Security Conference, undated,

13 = = They wanted to take the initiative, prevent NATO intervention, show unity among the Eastern bloc, and raise disagreements among the Western powers. See: HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-1-001386. Attachment on European Security Conference, undated.

practical issues.[14] As usual in the unproblematic Hungarian-Finnish relations at the time, the discussions were not so successful only out of obligatory diplomatic politeness, but because Hungary and Finland shared a common interest in promoting the conference.[15] It is obvious that Hungary used the situation to its advantage, realizing that Finns tried from all sides to get their neutrality policy recognized and to improve their international prestige[16]—which was actually taking place.

In the meanwhile, the Finnish Ambassador in Budapest had been called home by Kekkonen because he had accused the socialist countries of an intervention in the conference matter.[17] He had trod on Kekkonen's toes and offended the Soviets, too—but Kekkonen found a solution to the dilemma. He ordered his political advisors to draft Finland's own proposal, different from the one the Soviets had offered, which did not include the great NATO states (the USA and Canada), with the suggestion that the venue for the final summit would be Helsinki. This made the proposal and, consequently the CSCE project, very tightly attached to Kekkonen's person.[18] By making the proposal more congenial to the West, he showed how he could act independently of Soviet monitoring. CSCE became a political mission for him, not only a gesture of encouraging further European détente and supranational rapprochement; he already felt that it would be his last and splendid opportunity to show off internationally and prove also to the Finns how he could promote the country's national and international interests in such a grand manner. Additionally, Helsinki, where the spies of West and East had built their nests on fer--tile ground, was also geopolitically very suitable for conferences. It was an attractive, lively city between East and West—Stockholm was out of the question in the Soviets' eyes—and it boasted a new, grand venue, too: the recently opened, concert and conference oriented Finlandia Hall.

It may be worth mentioning that during his visit to Washington in July 1970, Kekkonen wanted to remove Nixon's suspicions about the conference with two arguments he had prepared based on reflections about talks with the leaders of some small Eastern European countries, Kádár most influential among them. Kekkonen reminded Nixon that the USA had to consider the strong interest of those countries

14 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1969/37/44-1. Note of the negotiations between Kádár and Kekkonen, September 29, 1969

15 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1969/37/44-1. Note of the negotiations between Kádár and Kekkonen, September 29, 1969.

16 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1970/36/44-142 Ferenc Esztergályos's letter to Helsinki, March 5, 1971 (the background for the proposal of Finland concerning the German question);. HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-10. Agoston's letter to Budapest, September 30, 1971.

17 = = Juhani Suomi, ed., *Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 3* [Diaries of Urho Kekkonen 2–3] (Otava, 2002), 50–51.

18 = = Jakobson, *Tilinpäätös*, 64–65.

in expressing and strengthening their national identity. He added that the conference could be a risk to the Soviet Union in its relations with the satellites. Nixon rose to the bait, but Kissinger, as usual, had his proviso about the Soviets.[19] In any case, Kekkonen's straightforward performance accelerated the preparations for the conference, which was also on the agenda during the visits of PM Fock and Foreign Minister Péter from Hungary to Finland in early 1971. It was agreed that the passivity of the West and further conditions for the conference laid down by the USA had to be cleared out of the way.[20]

After preparatory discussions in Helsinki from November 1972 onwards, the first operative stage of the CSCE was formally opened there on July 3, 1973. Then the proceedings moved to Geneva for practical and logistical reasons. A rearguard boost to the CSCE process was given by Kádár during yet another top-level state visit to Finland in September 1973. Having convinced Kádár that Finland's joining the EEC would not cause any trouble in the relations of the kinship-countries, nor would it slow the CSCE process down, Kekkonen expressed his appreciation of how Hungary cooperated in the preparation of the CSCE. Kádár responded that Hungarians admired how Finland, a small country, could play such a great role in international relations, particularly in building bridges between East and West—the same policy West initially condemned but now followed itself. Kádár had recently observed certain opposition (not pointing to any country) to the "Helsinki idea," but he reassured Kekkonen that it was "only everyday practice," not the leading historical process which was now carried forward by Hungary and Finland together.[21]

Finally, the hosting of the ceremonial closing session of the conference was entrusted to Finland. The highest-ranking political leaders of the participating states assembled in Helsinki in Finlandia Hall from July 31 to August 1, 1975 and signed the final act in the presence of the UN Secretary-General. It has become customary to say that everybody won something there; the first "basket" was a victory for the Soviets and the Eastern bloc because it contained the affirmation of state borders in Europe. The second "basket" contained mostly economic matters—for instance, it heeded Hungarian hopes for opening trading relations with the West—and the third one included the clause on human rights and freedom of movement of ideas and information, which was a merit to the USA. For Hungary in particular, it offered legality for strengthening its cultural ties with the Hungarians living outside its borders (especially in Romania) and an asset to defend the cause of minorities in follow-up conferences, very tangible achievements further enhanced by

19 = = Jorma Kallenautio, *Suomi kylmän rauhan maailmassa* [Finland in the World of Cold Peace] (SKS, 2005), 355.

20 = = UMA, Unkari, 94 D/K71 Kari Kupiainen's press release, January 25, 1971.

21 = = HU-MNL-OL-M-KS 288/5/621. Announcement of comrade Kádár's visit to Finland, October 4, 1973.

Kádár's stately speech during the final act of the conference.[22] Finland too was a winner, because this was the first time since the Congress of Vienna that every European nation was granted the right to neutrality, and Kekkonen utilized the situation by stressing that the summit took place on neutral ground. Hosting it was a unique honor for him. There were high hopes that the CSCE could help in ending the Cold War, introducing a new, more open style in European international relations and with it, clarifying Finland's own international position and increased significance. This was not to happen yet, as a setback followed: in 1978, in the spirit of the bilateral YYA Treaty,[23] the Soviets proposed combined military exercises to Finland. One can understand that Kekkonen was deeply disappointed. If relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were to be based on mutual trust as was agreed, this proposal betrayed it.[24]

At this point, it is worth noting that the second of the Eastern bloc gains of the conference, cited from the memo of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry above, was affirmed by Henry Kissinger: "In Helsinki all the Eastern European countries increased their maneuvering room and felt encouraged by Ford's demonstrative visit to the most independent of them [Finland]."[25]

= = = Helsinki's Aftermath: Kádár and Kekkonen's Joint Efforts to Secure the Results of the CSCE

But again, why was the summit important for Hungary? Here I refer only to a couple of additional, well-known points, but perhaps they add something from the Finnish angle. As the CSCE granted, in theory at least, the opportunity to declare nonalignment and neutrality, it could be used by Hungary: on one hand, in committing to strengthening the status quo within the bloc, and on the other hand, promoting détente—later possibly the opening of borders, but securing its own territorial integrity. It was a security guarantee to it within the Eastern bloc as a sovereign socialist country which had to fear neither aggressive intervention from any side nor dangers of internal unrest. It could now direct international attention to the problems of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. Showing such a firm stance gained recognition for Hungary from the West. In Finland, this situation was

22 = = Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, trans. Tim Wilkinson (Corvina, 1999), 407; László Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary* (Kossuth Printing House, 1999), 456.

23 = = The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (1948). The main difference between this treaty and the ones of Hungary and Romania was that the Soviet Union would not interfere in internal Finnish affairs.

24 = = Pohjonen, "In Kekkonen and Kádár We Trust," 121.

25 = = Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs* (Simon & Schuster, 1999), 660.

readily understood, and the improvement of Hungary's position was watched with a keen eye. Even though the future would show that the declarations made in Helsinki did not have all their intended bearings on political realities in Europe, the CSCE gave hope to all the smaller countries of Europe that there would be a longer period of peace ahead,[26] although it was not possible to know what kind of peace. A Cold Peace, perhaps? It was soon widely realized that the conference had barely changed the policy of the Soviet Union. This was what Kissinger had suspected.

During Kekkonen's last visit to Hungary in November 1976, relatively soon after the CSCE, two elderly, very experienced, and in their own countries still popular statesmen discussed in the Parliament on November 17 and 18 in a friendly atmosphere. They dealt first with the latest developments and problems of their countries' domestic politics but soon changed the subject to the CSCE, as it was the main topic on the agenda. Kádár and Kekkonen reflected on its results and glanced towards the future. Typically for Kekkonen, who had been wary of the Soviets since the 1956 invasion of Hungary and who had experienced the Prague shock in 1968,[27] his tone was again skeptical. To him, détente remained the crucial question for small countries, and that was the reason why everybody should keep their focus on the CSCE's follow-up conferences. For his part, Kádar recognized how neutral Finland was, but that as a socialist country Hungary's most important friend was the Soviet Union. Respecting the Helsinki agreements, Hungary was willing to have good relations with every country; indeed, with Finland they had already been quite unproblematic from the early 1960s on.[28] The common interest between the countries was détente and for its sake, Hungary was willing to fight, Kádár emphasized. However, what was paramount to Hungary was its national interest;[29] primarily the leaders of Hungary sought the interest of their own nation because Hungarians had gone through so many agonies that there was no reason to cause any more grief. This was what the Hungarians appreciated, and this was the reason why they supported the regime.

26 = = This hope was expressed both by Kekkonen and Kádár, pointing to their success in propagating the peaceful coexistence of European nations. See Kádár's speech in *Magyar Történeti Szöveggyűjtemény 1941–1999 II* [Hungarian Historical Sourcebook 1941–1999 II], ed. Ignác Romsics (Osiris, 2000), 344.

27 = = Anssi Halmesvirta, "Finlandizálas, a hideg béke és az intő magyar példa" [Finlandization, the Cold Peace, and the warning example of Hungary], *Debreceni Disputa* 6, no. 9 (2008): 5–9.

28 = = See e.g., Anssi Halmesvirta, *Co-operation across the Iron Curtain: Hungarian-Finnish Scientific Relations of the Academies from the 1960s to the 1990s*, Studies in General History 12 (Jyväskylä University, 2005).

29 = = HU-MNL-OL-M-KS 288/4/147–148. Briefing about the actual international questions to the members of the Central Committee, December 1, 1976; Juhani Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu* [Closing the Track] (Otava, 2000), 88.

This was very similar to what had also been Kekkonen's main concern since World War II; for their part, Finns had suffered from agonies, especially during the Winter War, which had been followed by the harsh peace conditions after the Continuation War. For both leaders, it was self-evident that, without good relations with the Soviet Union, it was hardly possible to exercise one's own foreign policy. It was not a question of whether the Soviets accepted something or not, but the relations with them had to be based on mutual trust. Hungary and Finland were secure because they did not act against the Soviet interests but, in the final instance, in the interest of their own nation's present and future. Neither Kádár nor Kekkonen had illusions about the Soviets, and they practiced political pragmatism; Hungary aimed at being a more human-faced, more independent model for the socialist camp and was, due to the CSCE, apparently able to push for room to maneuver within it, whereas Finland had become an example of how a democratic country could survive and act on its own in diplomacy. Both leaders were, for the time being, unchallenged leaders of their countries. For Finland it also meant a democratic deficit ("internal Finlandization")—for Hungary, softened dictatorship. In Hungary, it was impossible to see the future without socialism, albeit with the burden of an inefficient and indebted economy;[30] in Finland, it was impossible to see the future without Kekkonen.

Irrespective of this emphasis on détente, the influence of the Soviets could also be felt during the 1976 visit. The problem was the wording of the final *communiqué*. Kekkonen had demanded that there be a phrase pointing to Finland's neutrality in the text. Kádár had told Kekkonen privately that he regarded Finland as a neutral country, but it was difficult to put it on paper. After lengthy and frustrating negotiations, the magic word was added in the document—the permission to use it having come from Moscow.[31] That was the small price Kádár had to pay for his policy, and that was the reward Kekkonen had achieved with his policy. More tangible, and certainly promising for the future, was the agreement of scientific cooperation between the MTA and Academy of Finland, boosted by the Helsinki spirit and signed in 1976. It bore remarkable fruit in many fields.[32]

Kádár and Kekkonen understood each other almost all too well, and the CSCE was a success story for them both. It was not only symbolic that Kekkonen had placed Kádár next to him at the state dinner, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975.[33]

30 = = Nigel Swain, *The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism* (Verso, 1992).

31 = = Suomi, *Umpeutuva latu*, 127.

32 = = See Halmesvirta, *Co-operation across the Iron Curtain*, 32–37.

33 = = Cf. Kimmo Rentola, "Kekkonen and Kádár in the Soviet Sphere of Influence," in *Kádár's Hungary – Kekkonen's Finland*, Hungarologische Beiträge 14, ed. Anssi Halmesvirta (University of Jyväskylä—Kopi-Jyvä, 2002), 113.

Following the successful execution of the Helsinki summit, Hungary and Finland soon planned coordinated cooperation in the Belgrade follow-up meeting in 1977. The CSCE had served the interests of détente quite well, but the political atmosphere had changed for the worse and the dialogue between East and West had slowed to an ideological struggle. Kádár and Kekkonen had agreed to take care that Belgrade did not become a venue for mutual accusations and a one-sided agenda, containing only the issues fixed in the third basket's clauses—on human rights, family relations, and the exchange of information—with which the Western continuously pressurized socialist countries. The common aim was also to isolate the forces which exacerbated the Cold War. Kádár had emphasized that the détente spirit was not enough;[34] it had to be followed by "military détente."[35] (NATO was reluctant to remove forces from Central Europe.)[36] Finland and Hungary wanted to increase and endorse the cooperation sectors to which Helsinki's final act had given momentum: especially well-functioning bilateral agreements on cultural, educational, and scientific exchange. Hungary also wanted to free itself from trading and other kinds of economic discrimination.[37] Finland's principal aim was to enhance or at least keep up the Helsinki détente spirit, which seemed to be evaporating. However, it continued its propagation of the nuclear-free zones and further disarmament. All the same, these plans reflected the precariousness of the entire CSCE process, the success of which ultimately depended on the relative imbalance of the relations between the two juxtaposed blocs. To make a lasting impact on it was nearly impossible for such small agents as Finland and Hungary, and if some achievement appeared to last, a sudden crisis in great power politics could jeopardize it. However, Finland, playing the leading role and Hungary giving necessary rearguard support, protected their national and international interests together by promoting peace and security (stability) in Europe. In this they succeeded, at least for a time.

= = = Epilogue

The President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, commented via TV on the twenty-third of August on the historical importance of the CSCE to Finland. He put it neatly: with the CSCE, the right of self-determination of Finland started to liberate itself—he did not have to mention from what. When it comes to the recent activity of the

34 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1976/53/44-1. Frigyes Puja's report to Council of Ministers, November 24, 1976.

35 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1978/51/44-1. List of Hungary's aims of disarmament (Gajda Ferenc), May 28, 1978.

36 = = HU-MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-1976/53/44-1 Frigyes Puja to János Berecz, September 10, 1976; Endre Erdős's note, October 7, 1976.

37 = = HU-MNL-OL-M-KS 288/5/719. Frigyes Puja's announcement, May 31, 1977.

successor of the CSCE—the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, established in 1995), which held a grotesque summit in Helsinki last summer—one of the organizers of the 1975 summit put it bluntly: it is a great disappointment. The so called "Helsinki spirit" is in deep sleep, and only the idea remains.[38]

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/// Yugoslavia, the Helsinki Process, and the Challenges of Collective Security in Europe (1973–1975)

Abstract

The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, following a sudden complication due to harsh Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, coincided with the establishment of a global political atmosphere of détente, as well as with the increasingly visible determination of the Yugoslav leadership to build a new model of national security within the framework of achieving pan-European security, which paved the way for the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. During the Conference in Helsinki from July 1973 to August 1975, Yugoslavia, together with a group of European non-aligned and neutral countries, contributed significantly to freeing this conference from the antagonistic framework of block confrontations and to approaching the solving of key international problems through democratic dialogue among the participants. The Yugoslav government placed great importance on the outcome of the Conference because they believed that this meeting could potentially play a very important role: both in the reaffirmation of the basic premise of the policy of non-alignment, as well as in the efforts to strengthen the European component of Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia showed a special interest in solving questions of the inviolability of borders and provided a favorable outcome of the debate on the necessity of linking questions of European security with the security of the Mediterranean.

= = = Introduction

The issue of socialist Yugoslavia's attitude toward the problems of collective security in Europe in the context of strengthening Soviet interventionism, the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, and armed tensions in the Mediterranean Basin has thus far been viewed in historiography primarily in the context of Yugoslavia's attitude toward individual conflicts and major political

events. Certainly, hitherto little-or rarely used sources, mainly stored in the archival funds of the Presidency of the Socialist Federate Republic Yugoslavia (SFRY) and central party bodies kept in the Archives of Yugoslavia, as well as diplomatic documents preserved within the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, provide answers to a number of research questions. These questions include the place and role of Yugoslavia during the Helsinki process, the Yugoslav position in relation to the policies of the great powers, ensuring security in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the nature of Yugoslav efforts to firmly preserve the principle of the inviolability of existing state borders.

The short-lived war in the Middle East in 1967, the quick defeat of the armies of the Arab countries in the conflict with Israel, the slow and incoherent reaction of the non-aligned world, and the absence of more effective mechanisms to help the Arab countries encouraged the Yugoslav state leadership to think about a more effective way to protect its own national security.[1] The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, which followed only a year later, presented the existing problem of Yugoslav foreign policy with new challenges.[2] The return of interventionism to the European political scene demanded new answers from Yugoslavia. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations—after a sudden complication due to harsh Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia—coincided with both the establishment of a global political atmosphere of détente, as well as the increasingly visible commitment of the Yugoslav leadership to build a new model of national security within the framework of achieving pan-European security. This latter development created a favorable atmosphere in mutual bilateral relations and opened the way to a more relaxed approach to the problems of European cooperation.[3]

During the first half of the '70s, one can trace the increasingly energetic efforts of Josip Broz Tito and his collaborators to maximally strengthen the European component of the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment and to suppress, as far as possible, the ever-present tendency for non-alignment to predominantly acquire the features of the Afro-Asian movement. Nevertheless, the political circles in Belgrade were undoubtedly satisfied that at the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka in September

1 = = On the impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War on the national security of Yugoslavia, see Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, *Jugoslavija i Arapsko-izraelski rat 1967* [Yugoslavia and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War] (ISI, 2010).

2 = = On the main directions of Soviet foreign policy in that period, see Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

3 = = On Yugoslavia's attitude toward the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, see Ljubodrag Dimić, "Pogled iz Beograda na Čehoslovačku 1968. godine" [View from Belgrade to Czechoslovakia in 1968], *Tokovi istorije* 3–4 (2005): 205–32; Jan Pelikan, *Yugoslavie a Pražsko jaro 1968* [Yugoslavia and Prague Spring 1968] (Univerzita Karlova, 2008).

1970, the Yugoslav initiative on the need to form a movement that would gather all non-bloc countries was finally accepted. Yugoslavia, as the leader of that movement, secured a respectable position in the sphere of international relations and the role of an important mediator in the negotiations between the two superpowers. This was even more so, as the non-aligned countries at that time had a convincing majority in the United Nations and easily secured the adoption of an entire series of decisions and declarations in that organization that were compatible with Yugoslav key foreign policy priorities.[4]

Many years of drowning in the Third World carried the danger that Yugoslavia would acquire the status of a kind of "gray zone" in Europe, since it was not known exactly whether it belonged in the camp of socialist states or not. Tito openly expressed his fear that the current situation could lead to a situation "that one day we will be hanging in the air."[5] The fear that the Americans, in order to achieve Soviet concessions on some important European and world issues, would relegate the interests of Yugoslavia to the background and abandon the previous strategy of supporting Yugoslav independence seemed more and more realistic. The current readiness of the United States to meet the Soviet initiative to convene a conference on European security, as well as the aspiration of the two superpowers to shape the political map of the world through direct negotiations, greatly contributed to the fears of Yugoslav officials. Although Tito advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence between the conflicting blocs and supported the doctrine of American President Richard Nixon on the need for a period of confrontation to give way to one of negotiations, he feared that the increasingly emphasized mutual cooperation of the two superpowers would not ultimately result in their settlements at the expense of small states.[6]

Apart from Yugoslav reservations regarding bipolar détente, which stemmed from the fear of an American-Soviet solution that would harm Yugoslavia, Tito and his associates were disturbed by the belief that the preparations for the so-called Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) increasingly indicated the supremacy of the two bloc groups in the consideration and regulation of practically all important international issues. These issues, according to the assessment of official Belgrade, would be resolved from the position of great power, involving mutually recognized and respected interests and the division of spheres of influence. In their view, this would be based on a balance of power and consensus and the

4 = = Dragan Bogetić, "Jugoslavija između Istoka i Zapada" [Yugoslavia between East and West], in *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu* [*Yugoslavia in the Cold War*], ed. Aleksandar Životić (INIS, 2010), 13–36.

5 = = AY-507/III/151–3. Discussion by J.B. Tito, Fifteenth session of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Society, December 3–4, 1970.

6 = = On Yugoslav-American relations, see Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971* [Yugoslav-American Relations 1961-1971], (ISI, 2012).

legitimacy of the most powerful countries. From the Yugoslav perspective, this was in direct contradiction to the concept of non-alignment, as well as to Yugoslav efforts to ensure that all countries participated equally in solving key international problems on the international stage. For this reason, Tito constantly criticized the limitations of the current bipolar détente and the provisionality of the solutions adopted by the two superpowers without or even against the will of the other states. Such a situation in international relations essentially represented the negation of the Non-Aligned Movement as an important and independent international factor.[7]

Therefore, Yugoslav officials attached great importance to the preparations for the CSCE, considering that this meeting could potentially play an extremely important role: both as part of the reaffirmation of the basic premises of the policy of non-alignment, and as part of efforts to maximally strengthen the European component of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. In addition, it was based on the position that European security undoubtedly represents the main guarantor of Yugoslavia's security.[8]

= = = Search for a Model of Collective Security

Tito and the leadership of Yugoslav diplomacy were aware that the realization of these goals was not possible without the synchronized joint performance of all non-bloc member states of the CSCE. That is why it was necessary for a small group of European non-aligned states (Yugoslavia, Malta and Cyprus) to achieve as close cooperation as possible and harmonize their performance with European neutral states (Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden). It seemed quite feasible since both groups of countries had the same interest: to thwart the efforts of the bloc groups to act as closed political and military entities that were focused on reaching compromises that concerned their narrower interests and strategic commitments. Otherwise, in the intermediate space between bloc alliances, neutral and non-aligned states would play the role of extras who would not be able to seriously influence the course of the conference. In such a situation, the non-bloc European states, proceeding from mutually related interests and similar points of view, approached the harmonization of their activities. This later led to the gradual formation of an action group of non-aligned and neutral states at the CSCE, which strongly influenced the course of the meeting and the content of the adopted documents.[9]

7 = = Dragan Bogetić, "Američke analize budućnosti Jugoslavije posle Tita s početka 70-tih godina" [American analyses of the future of Yugoslavia after Tito from the beginning of the 70s], *Tokovi istorije* 1 (2012): 159–174; Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita 1944–1974* [Yugoslavia and the Cold War: essays on the foreign policy of Josip Broz Tito 1944–1974] (Arhipelag, 2014), 357–83.

8 = = DAMFA-PA-292/49410. Yugoslav views on the problems of European cooperation and security, n.d.

9 = = AY-803/608. On the eve of the pan-European in Helsinki, May 23, 1972.

The first comprehensive view of Yugoslav officials regarding the holding of the conference on European security was presented on July 25, 1969 in their response to the memorandum of the Finnish government, which at that time was sent to the governments of all European countries, the USA, and Canada.[10] Namely, in the memorandum, dated May 5, 1969, the Finnish government had expressed its support for the initiative of Eastern European countries to hold the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*. The memorandum had set out the principles on which the work of that Conference should be based, as well as Finland's proposal to host the Conference. In a letter to Finnish Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen, Yugoslavia resolutely supported the Finnish initiative and emphasized its readiness to "in accordance with its general policy of active peaceful coexistence and non-alignment [...] fully engage in efforts to establish an atmosphere of trust and develop broad and versatile cooperation based on the principles of the UN Charter." Insisting that the future Conference must be conceived in such a way as to ensure the reaffirmation of the principles within the UN Charter, the Yugoslav government at the same time considered it necessary to specify that it would be primarily about the principles for which all non-aligned states were persistently advocating: "primarily about the principle of sovereignty, independence, equality, refraining from the use of force or pressure in international relations and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries." From the Yugoslav side, the need to avoid bloc exclusivity during the preparations for the Conference and to ensure the equal participation of all European countries, regardless of their size and military and political power, was highlighted.[11]

In the course of 1970, Yugoslavia sent the governments of European countries, the USA, and Canada a series of proposals related to issues of European security and cooperation, of which the Preliminary Draft Declaration on the Principles of European Cooperation and Security was particularly important. In that document, as in other Yugoslav proposals, several political premises were insisted upon that would determine the meaning and content of the Conference on European security. First of all, it was started from the point of view that the CSCE should be a gathering of sovereign states in which they would participate and decide on an equal basis, and that it should cover the issue of European security and cooperation in all its aspects, not only in those in which the blocs were currently interested. In this sense, the Conference had to represent an integral part and a factor in the process of radically transforming European relations, and not in the freezing of bloc divisions. In this way, the conditions would be created for the current, limited, bipolar détente

10 = = Radovan Vukadinović, *Urho Kekkonnen – borac za mir* [Urho Kekkonnen – fighter for peace] (Globus, 1977), 134.

11 = = DAMFA-PA-292/49418. The response of the Yugoslav government to the Memorandum of the Finnish government, July 25, 1969.

between the two superpowers to grow into a wider, universal détente and impose itself as a global process in which all states would be involved, and which would include all parts of the world and all important international problems.[12]

During the Preparatory Meeting in Helsinki, major differences surfaced in the initial negotiating positions of the participating states. They were so significant that for a long time it was not clear how an agreement would be reached. The differences were conditioned by the different specific interests and long-term strategic goals of those countries. The Warsaw Pact countries (except Romania) sought to sanction the territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe at the future Conference. The NATO countries aimed to enable significant changes in Eastern Europe by improving détente, and thus to overcome the existing status quo in that area. Neutral and non-aligned countries (and above all Yugoslavia) saw in the Conference a solid framework for the improvement of the broader process of cooperation in Europe, as well as a significant change in the existing situation, with its accentuated bloc and Cold War characteristics. Therefore, the USSR and its allies wanted the consolidation and strengthening of the existing status quo; NATO wanted changes, but only on one side (in the East); and the non-bloc countries wanted radical changes on both sides of the bloc's demarcation line—that is, in Europe as a whole.[13]

During the Consultative Meeting, the Yugoslav delegation, together with a group of non-aligned and neutral European states, played a notable role in bridging the constant bloc exclusivity, which occasionally called into serious question the process of harmonizing the views of the Conference participants on the key issues of organizing this European gathering. The group of eight non-bloc states often assumed the role of an unavoidable mediator between the confronted blocs, but also that of a constructive initiator of a series of proposals that largely determined the content of the Conference and the adopted documents.[14] After a six-month debate, the ambassadors of the thirty-four participating states[15] adopted the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations. All European countries, except Albania and Monaco, participated in the Consultative Meeting in Helsinki. Monaco, however, joined the work of the CSCE as soon as the first phase of that meeting be-

12 = = AY-803/8. Draft SFRY Platform on European Security and cooperation n.d.; AY-837-I-2/63. Draft platform for the CSCE, June 26, 1973.

13 = = Gordon F. Sander, *The Finnish Front Line: Kekkonen, Kennedy, and Khruschev's Cold War Showdown* (Cornell University Press, 2025), 332–45; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 418–25.

14 = = Ranko Petković, *Aktivnost grupe neutralnih i nesvrstanih zemalja na KEBS-u* [Activity of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries at the CSCE] (FPZ, 1979), 106–11.

15 = = AY-803/608. Information on the positions of the participating countries at the Preparatory Conference in Helsinki on European cooperation and security, June 26, 1973.

gan, in July 1973. Albania was thus the only European country that refused to participate in the Conference. On several occasions, the Albanian government emphasized "that the initiators of the Conference are American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, the very ones who keep alive the aggressive blocs, the NATO Pact and the Warsaw Pact."[16] Therefore, in Tirana they characterized the Conference as a "comedy that has the rhythm of a pacifist tam-tam superpower." In the context of Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the evident attempt to approach Yugoslavia by warming up very complicated mutual relations, Yugoslav diplomacy considered such a stance of the Albanian government to be harmful not only to overall European security, but also to the prospects of bilateral relations—which for the Yugoslav side had not only regional, but exceptional internal importance.

In this sense, the first point of the agenda was reduced to the wording "the problem of security in Europe," although the central issue was related to the inviolability and immutability of post-war borders: an issue that for years had driven Eastern European countries to push for the holding of this Conference. Namely, those countries saw the future, final act of the Conference as a substitute for the unrealized peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Union and its allies wanted, through the solutions adopted at the European Conference, to end the territorial-political status quo in Europe. The second item on the agenda included the consideration of "the issue of cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology and protection of the human environment." The central place on the agenda was actually held by the consideration of the problem of the "most favored nation clause": concessions requested from Western countries by Eastern European countries and respect for the principle of full reciprocity in trade, which was in turn a condition of the West for providing the aforementioned concession to the East. Therefore, it was about improving the economic cooperation of European countries through the gradual neutralization of the negative effect of the regional closure of Western and Eastern European organizations (which the East insisted on) and the liberalization of the existing system of trade exchange (which was the demand of the West). And yet, in this sphere of negotiations, the negative effect of the ideological-political divergence among the bloc formations was felt very little, and the preliminary agreements on this topic were concluded relatively quickly and successfully in Helsinki—to which Yugoslav representatives made a notable contribution by insisting on universal principles.[17]

16 = = AY-837/I-3-a/148. Information on the position of the People's Republic of Albania and relations with the SFR Yugoslavia after the aggression against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, July 8, 1973.

17 = = AY-837/I-2/63. On the results of the Preparatory Talks in Helsinki, August 1, 1973.

= = = Conference After the Conference

The idea of a "conference after the conference" was conceived in Belgrade and strongly supported by a group of non-aligned and neutral states at the CSCE. During the Consultative Meeting in Helsinki, the Yugoslav delegation insisted that, after the Conference, the ongoing work of harmonizing opposing and discordant positions should be continued and that solutions should be found for new problems that would arise later. In doing so, it was based on the point of view that, for the effective implementation of the decisions of the Conference and their further development, it was necessary to form special bodies that would be in charge of this; they would monitor the process of realizing the mentioned decisions and schedule new meetings of the participating countries of the Conference, so that the action started in Helsinki would grow into a long-term process, and the Conference into an organization. Because of this performance of Yugoslavia during the preparations for the Conference and during its holding, and as a sign of recognition, a decision was made to hold the next gathering of European states in Belgrade during 1977, which would represent a kind of continuation of the Helsinki Conference.[18] However, the Yugoslav initiative at the preparatory meeting in Helsinki—to consider the issue of the continuity of that Conference and the formation of institutional mechanisms for this purpose—was only partially accepted. Namely, it was agreed that this issue would be discussed at the Conference as part of the special, fourth item on the agenda. However, the wording related to that point of the agenda was extremely vague and general, so that in itself it did not hint at a later, more serious step forward in that context. It was actually about the reluctance of the bloc formations to make a more specific commitment regarding the future organized system of political negotiations in which all European states would be involved. While the Eastern European countries allowed the possibility of occasionally convening pan-European gatherings, the Western powers showed an extremely reserved attitude and opposed any solution that would lead to the institutionalization of this negotiation process.[19] Incidentally, when it comes to the appearance of Yugoslavia together with a group of non-aligned and neutral countries during the Consultative Meeting in Helsinki, the result achieved during the adoption of the "democratic rules of procedure" is particularly noteworthy. In order to eliminate the possibility of overvoting and imposing decisions that would be of interest only to bloc formations, this group of countries insisted that all decisions be made solely on the basis of the rules of general agreement (consensus).[20]

18 = = AY-837-I-2/63. On the results of the Preparatory Talks in Helsinki, August 1, 1973.

19 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Final recommendations from the Consultation in Helsinki, September 9, 1973.

20 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the second phase of multilateral talks at the CSCE in Helsinki from 15 January to 9 February 1973.

The role of Yugoslavia and the non-aligned and neutral states in the formulation of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations was particularly highlighted during the debate on the content of the agenda and priorities of the CSCE. Those countries insisted both on expanding the agenda to include military aspects of security in Europe, as well as on a comparative consideration and connection of military and political aspects of European security. (The bloc powers did not show interest in military issues being discussed at the Conference.) They believed that negotiations on disarmament should retain a narrower, bilateral character and that only representatives of bloc formations should participate in them. The inclusion of other European countries in the negotiations, in this sense, would only make it more difficult to achieve mutually acceptable compromises.[21] Thanks to the aforementioned initiative, a special chapter was included in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, which provided for the adoption of "confidence-building measures": prior notification of major military maneuvers by the countries participating in the Conference, exchange of observers at the maneuvers, notification of major troop movements, as well as consideration of political aspects of the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.[22] Yugoslavia opposed the efforts of the two blocs to limit the debate at the Conference to finding mutually acceptable compromises exclusively in relation to the narrower area of Central Europe.

At the Consultative Meeting in Helsinki, the representatives of Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Malta insisted on the inclusion of the "Mediterranean component" in the concept of European security, given that it was difficult to achieve security in Europe in conditions when the Mediterranean was the scene of confrontation between the great powers and the focus of sharp local conflicts (e.g., the Middle East crisis, the Cyprus crisis). They advocated for universal solutions that would concern not only the strictly European area, but also the Balkans and the Mediterranean, as well as the area of the Middle East. Admittedly, the Yugoslav proposal to include non-European, Mediterranean countries in the work of the was not accepted. It was agreed, however, that those countries could participate in the part of the debate that would concern the security of the Mediterranean.[23]

= = = The First Phase of the CSCE

The first phase of the CSCE was held in Helsinki from July 3 to 7, 1973 at the level of foreign ministers. A total of thirty-five countries officially accepted the invitation to participate in this four-day meeting (all European countries except Albania, which

21 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Military aspects of European security, n.d.

22 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE, July 18, 1973.

23 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on multilateral preparations for European Helsinki, 22 November 1972–8 June 1973.

did not even participate in the preparatory meeting). At the meeting, the text of the Final Recommendation of the Helsinki Consultation was formally adopted without any changes, and the general positions adopted at the Preparatory Meeting, which had ended a month before, were reaffirmed. The modalities of the procedure, general rules, agenda, and instructions for the working bodies of the Conference were adopted. The ministers of the participating countries submitted their proposals for texts for the preparation of documents for the next phase of the CSCE. When it came to the first item on the agenda ("the problem of security in Europe"), the most important items were the proposals concerning the preparation of the Conference's basic document: on the "principles of relations between the participating states." It is already noticeable at first sight that a compromise was reached between the position of the East on the inviolability of borders and the position of the West, which insisted on respecting the principles of human rights and basic freedoms. Both principles were included in the draft of the future declaration. The remaining principles, which to a greater or lesser extent were complementary to the aforementioned two, were included in the draft of the final act, partly thanks to the activities of the Yugoslav delegation. Namely, neutral and non-aligned countries supported the proposal of the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milos Minic, as set forth in the Yugoslav "draft declaration on the principles by which the participating countries are guided in their relations."[24] Explaining the intention of this document, Minic emphasized the need to reaffirm the democratic principles of international relations on which the UN Charter is based. In proportion to the extent to which these principles were still current, the bloc division of the world and the efforts of the great powers to redraw the map of the world against the will of other countries seemed "outdated" and "anachronistic" to Minic. Minic's performance was, in fact, a call for the construction of a new democratic system in Europe, in which the relations of European states would "rest on secure and permanent foundations, devoid of the current bloc division."[25]

During the first phase of the negotiations of the European countries, the foreign ministers decided that the CSCE should continue and that the second phase should begin in Geneva on September 18, 1973. The expert bodies that were to take on the role of negotiators were instructed to prepare proposals for final documents based on the Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, so that those documents could be adopted in the third phase of the CSCE, in Helsinki. Political circles in Belgrade estimated that the first phase of the CSCE—the ministerial meeting in Helsinki—represented only a "starting point" in the European negotiation process

24 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Draft SFRY platform on European security and cooperation, July 3, 1973.

25 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Speech of the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the SFRY Miloš Minic at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, within the first phase of CSCE, Helsinki, July 5, 1973.

and a "quick compromise at the ministerial level," which only defined the main issues to be discussed but not the framework solutions. Instead of a working document that was supposed to be sent to experts for refinement during the second phase of the CSCE, the foreign ministers in Helsinki made only a list of a series of controversial issues—little more than an elaborate agenda.

= = = The Second Phase of the CSCE

The second phase of CSCE began in Geneva on September 18, 1973, and ended on July 21, 1975. The delegations were supposed to elaborate and concretize the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations and enable their final formulation in the form of a proposal for the Final Document—that is, the draft conclusions of the CSCE. It consisted of about four groups of proposals and conclusions that included: (1) military-political security and cooperation; (2) economic, scientific and technological cooperation; (3) cooperation in the field of human contact, information, culture and education; and (4) continuity of the Conference. This formal start of the second phase was preceded, in the period between August 29 and September 3, 1973, by several sessions of the highest organ of the CSCE: the Coordination Committee. At those meetings, it was relatively easy to reach an agreement that the work of the Conference should take place in four committees, formed according to the already defined basic areas of the agenda. [26]

However, the consideration of another issue that came before the Coordination Committee—one which concerned the implementation of the principled decision to invite non-European Mediterranean countries to participate in the Conference (which was particularly insisted on by the non-aligned countries Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Malta) turned out to be much more difficult. This issue was also the subject of dispute during the first phase of negotiations in Helsinki. Nevertheless, the problem was solved by adopting a compromise, which was made official immediately after the opening of the second phase of negotiations. The Western countries agreed that the Arab Mediterranean countries—Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia—would participate in the CSCE, but under the condition (which was accepted by other European countries) that Israel also participate in the meeting.[27]

The Yugoslav delegation, headed by the advisor to the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Djuro Nincic, had obviously been instructed by its government that it must be active in all phases of the general debate on all relevant issues on the agenda, and at the same time, that it must be present in all areas of the preparation of the final document. Therefore, during the meeting in Geneva, the Yugoslav delegation submitted a whole series of proposals and launched a series of

26 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the CSCE, September 8, 1973.

27 = = DAMFA-PA/1973-176/41359. The Mediterranean Problem. Information on the work so far of the II phase of the CSCE, December 19, 1973.

initiatives, attempting to promote the Yugoslav foreign policy priorities and goals for which the Non-Aligned Movement stood. To this end, within the first item of the agenda Yugoslavia submitted a draft declaration on the principles that would guide the participating states in their relations (submitted in Helsinki and renewed in Geneva), a draft resolution on military aspects of security (a joint proposal with Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Switzerland, and Sweden), a draft resolution on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean (drafted together with Cyprus and Malta), a draft resolution on colonialism, and a draft declaration on national minorities. As part of the second item on the agenda, it submitted the following proposals: a draft resolution on the cooperation of participating countries with developing countries, a proposal on industrial cooperation and projects of common interest, and a proposal on solving issues related to worker migration. And, finally, within the fourth point of the agenda, the Yugoslav delegation submitted a draft resolution on the continuity of CSCE.[28]

Regardless of the extremely wide field of activities of the Yugoslav representatives to CSCE, the officials from Belgrade attached special importance to undoubtedly the most sensitive issue at the Conference, which already had a central place at the very beginning of the debate in Geneva and which was already resolved during the first part of the editorial work in the committees. It was the matter of borders. This issue became particularly relevant for Yugoslavia, since it was at the time of the Conference in Geneva that new tensions arose in Yugoslav-Italian relations regarding the provisional border in the Trieste region, established by the London memorandum in August 1954.[29] The renewed escalation of the Trieste crisis reached its apogee in the spring of 1974. The Yugoslav-Italian dispute gradually assumed the shape of a serious conflict in the Yugoslavia–NATO relationship. Such a turn of events occurred because precisely at this time, the NATO amphibious force maneuvers were organized in the area of the Gulf of Trieste. Yugoslav diplomatic officials had repeatedly accused the USA and NATO of siding with the Italian side by deciding to take action at a time when the crisis in this area was dangerously escalating. From that moment on, the dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy acquired a new, wider dimension and an even more serious character. In this sense, the position on the inviolability of borders implied the need to regulate the current border with Italy.[30]

28 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Issues related to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, December 12, 1973.

29 = = For more on the Yugoslav-Italian border conflict of 1974–75, see Saša Mišić, *Pomirenje na Jadranu: Jugoslavija i Italija na putu ka Osimskim sporazumima iz 1975* [Reconciliation on the Adriatic: Yugoslavia and Italy on the road to the 1975 Osim Accords] (FPN, 2018).

30 = = Aleksandar Životić, "The Soviet Union and Yugoslav-Italian Détente (1968-1973)," in *Italy and Tito's Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente*, ed. Massimo Bucarelli et al. (Peter Lang, 2015), 37–49.

On the question of the inviolability of the borders, at the outset there was a sharp polarization of the bloc viewpoints. Eastern European countries insisted that the existing borders, established after the Second World War, must be respected and must not be changed under any conditions. This proclaimed not only the principle of the inviolability of borders, but also the principle of their immutability. The West, on the other hand, advocated the point of view that the possibility of changing the borders by legal means (through international agreements) should be retained and "that the question of the definitiveness of the existing borders should be left open," which implicitly suggested the provisionality of the demarcation line of individual states. The members of the European Economic Community had in mind, above all, the option of later German unification, but also the vision of the territorial integration of Western Europe. Such an option, of course, was not acceptable to the leaders of the Eastern Bloc, precisely because it hinted at the possibility of the unification of the two German states through an agreement of the legitimate representatives of the German people (against the will of the Soviet Union). On the other hand, the solution advocated by the West did not lead to a permanent multilateral fixing of the current border between Poland and Germany (the border between East and West), which was the main reason Eastern European countries had initiated and were participating in the Conference.[31]

Yugoslavia was strongly against the solution advocated by most Western countries. Such a possible solution was interpreted within Yugoslav diplomatic circles as the existence of a new agreement on the territorial situation in Europe at some stage. The insistence on provisional borders was particularly unacceptable to Yugoslavia at a time when Italy contested the international legal status of its border with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in Belgrade it was believed that it was impossible to freeze a specific situation once and for all in each individual case. Therefore, the Yugoslav delegation proposed a compromise formulation acceptable to both parties (i.e., both NATO and the Warsaw Pact). That formulation, supported by the other non-bloc states and Romania, was based on the imperative to preserve the inviolability of the existing borders (any possibility of violently changing the borders was excluded), but at the same time it allowed for the possibility of changing the borders in specific cases by agreement of all interested actors. With minor corrections, this solution was included in the Final Document from Helsinki.[32]

The disagreement between the East and the West, which resulted in a months-long blockade of the work of the Conference, was overcome with the help and mediation of eight neutral and non-aligned countries (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Cyprus, and Yugoslavia). These countries proposed

31 = = DAMFA-PA/1974/176/417633. The principle of inviolability border (Information of the SFRY delegation on the work of phase II CSCE), January 15–April 6, 1974.

32 = = AY-803/26. The possibility of changing borders by agreement, Mach 14, 1974.

a balanced and realistic arrangement that was acceptable to both parties. Namely, the "protective provisions," insisted on by the bloc of pro-Soviet states, were included in the first principle of the Declaration on the principles of relations between participating states – in the principle of sovereign equality and explicitly included in the preamble of the "third basket."[33]

The tactics of the two sides and their reluctance to take the first step toward an acceptable compromise hinted at a new blockage in the work of the CSCE. Although that blockade was eventually removed after a several-month standstill, the pressure of time took its toll. Both groups were undoubtedly interested in the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the codification of part of their demands as part of the Final Document. Elements of a compromise solution were found in the revised Yugoslav proposal for military measures, submitted by a group of six neutral and non-aligned countries (Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Cyprus, and Yugoslavia) and with the strong support of Romania. In the original version of its proposal (devoid of any numerical parameters), Yugoslavia insisted on reaching an agreement on limiting some types of military activities in Europe and on starting negotiations on the reduction of armaments and military personnel. This meant the following: limiting military maneuvers in politically and strategically sensitive regions of Europe; banning the use of international waters and international airspace for the demonstration of armed force on the borders of sovereign states; refraining from the use of military force; and agreeing to stop the escalation of the military presence on European soil. Those views were formulated as early as 1970 and consistently propagated during the first phase of the CSCE. That proposal included "confidence-building measures": prior notification of major military maneuvers and troop movements in Europe; inviting foreign parties to those maneuvers; observing the notification of neighboring countries about smaller maneuvers; refraining from all types of mutual military activities that cause mutual distrust and tensions; and the publication of general data on mutual military budgets.[34] The second part of the proposal referred to the principles by which the participating states of the Conference should be guided in negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments.[35] It was actually about the principles for the codification of which Yugoslavia advocated throughout the Conference, despite the strong resistance of the bloc states. The purpose of this Yugoslav action was to include the participating countries of the CSCE in the military negotiations and to limit the previous exclusive monopoly of the two superpowers to conduct

33 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the CSCE, May 11, 1974.

34 = = DAMFA-PA/1974/176/417633. Information from the SFRY delegation on the work of the II phase of CSCE, June 1, 1974.

35 = = *Konferencija o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji. Dokumenti: 1975–1995* [Conference on European Security and Cooperation. Documents: 1975–1995], 22.

negotiations on all key military issues and disarmament in strict secrecy: alone or in the inner circle of their bloc allies. Yugoslav officials saw this in the fact that other countries were completely excluded from those negotiations.[36]

Thanks to the increasingly aggressive performance of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries at the CSCE, during the second phase of negotiations in Geneva, a special chapter was included in the Final Document, dedicated to issues of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area. With this, the agenda of the Conference was expanded to include another topic (the "fifth basket"), which Yugoslavia had insisted on from the very beginning. This was in the spirit of the Yugoslav thesis about the "indivisibility of peace," often emphasized by Tito in his public speeches. He pointed out that crisis hotspots from the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as from the entire Afro-Asian area, could spread to Europe in the shortest possible time, "that Europe cannot be an island of tranquility and well-being in a sea of world instability," and that "Europe cannot seek solutions to the vital issues of its security and prosperity by closing in on itself, because that would inevitably lead to its political and economic degradation."[37] The Yugoslav representatives insisted that the rules from the declaration on the principles of relations between the countries participating in the Conference must also apply in the relations of those countries with Mediterranean countries not participating in the Conference. Such Yugoslav attitudes during the CSCE were strongly supported by two non-aligned European states—Cyprus and Malta—and later by all neutral European states.[38] In the spirit of an integral treatment of European and Mediterranean security, a kind of precedent was set in the work of the Conference. Namely, five Mediterranean, non-European countries participated in the drafting of a special chapter in the Final Act, dedicated to the Mediterranean: Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.[39]

In an effort to promote the premises and principles of the policy of non-alignment during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the members of the Yugoslav delegation were the bearers of a whole series of initiatives aimed at the adoption of certain formulations in the Final Document that would link the issue of European security with the "removal of the bloc division of the world." At the same time, Yugoslavia tried in every way to free the European negotiation process from regional dimensions and give it a broader, universal character. Such a strategy resulted from the decisions and documents adopted at the Non-Aligned Summit in Algeria, held at the same time as the First Conference on

36 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the CSCE, June 8, 1974.

37 = = AY-837-I-2/63. President's speech.at the CSCE in Helsinki, July 31, 1975.

38 = = DAMFA-PA/1975/177/436559. Military aspects of security, n.d.

39 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Issues related to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, August 4, 1975.

European Security and Cooperation (September 1973). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milos Minic, reported in detail to his associates about the intention of the Yugoslav delegation's performance in this way at the meetings of the Presidency of the SFRY and the meetings of the innermost party leadership. The backbone of these initiatives lay in the relationship between the CSCE and the Summit in Algeria: in the effort of the Yugoslav delegates to emphasize "that we have a unique non-aligned policy; that our European policy is an integral part of this unique non-aligned foreign policy; that our positions in Helsinki must be based on the same basis as our positions in Algeria; that we do not have one position for Helsinki and another position for Algeria."[40]

Since one of the main outcomes of the Algerian summit was the decision to initiate international action with the aim of radically transforming the system of international economic relations and mitigating the growing gap that divided the rich North from the poor South, Yugoslavia asserted itself at the CSCE as the main proponent of this idea. It was encouraged by the fact that the UN General Assembly, at the Extraordinary Session in 1974 (on the initiative of non-aligned countries), adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. However, these efforts by Yugoslavia, due to the strong opposition of the Western countries, did not bear fruit. All that discussion, conducted as part of the second item on the agenda ("issues of cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology and protection of the human environment"), largely came down to the need to provide the conditions for the most generous aid from rich Western countries to "European and non-European developing countries." Since the West did not clearly show an inclination to assume the role of such a generous benefactor, the debate was, firstly, narrowed down to the "European South" (to the economic problem of "less-developed European countries"), and then reduced to general declarative formulations that did not oblige anyone to take concrete measures in that context.[41]

= = = The Final Document of the Conference

Although the work on shaping the Final Document of the CSCE was finally coming to an end during June 1975, issues related to the fourth item on the agenda—the continuity of the Conference—remained the only sphere in which editorial work was not carried out. Until the end of the second phase of the Conference, NATO members maintained an extremely reserved position on this issue, opposing any solution that would imply institutionalization—that is, reorgani-

40 = = AY-803/17. Presentation by the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Miloš Minic, Tape recording of the XXI session of the Presidency of the SFRY, held on June 25, 1973.

41 = = DAMFA-PA/1975/177/436559.Yugoslav initiatives at CSCE, September 20, 1975.

zation of the negotiation process initiated at the CSCE. The countries of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Romania, held a similar attitude, although they allowed the possibility of convening new pan-European meetings.[42]

The only real supporters of the continuation of the negotiation process on the security of Europe even after the end of the CSCE were, in fact, the neutral and non-aligned states and Romania. Their starting point in the matter of continuity mainly stemmed from the Yugoslav proposal formulated in March 1974 during the second phase of the Conference. The essence of that proposal consisted of the request for the establishment of a permanent, pan-European body (Permanent Council), which would coordinate and initiate the activities of European countries in the direction of implementation and realization of the decisions adopted at the CSCE. The non-bloc countries expressed their fear that in the absence of a decision on preserving the continuity of the Conference, the negotiation process of the European states now underway would be shut down, and that the process of détente in Europe would once again be reduced to negotiations and agreements of the blocs. The neutral and non-aligned countries undoubtedly felt much safer and more secure while all European states, plus the USA and Canada, sat together at the negotiating table. Therefore, for them, the adequate resolution of this fourth item on the agenda was of utmost importance.[43]

However, due to the strong resistance of the bloc powers, the idea of continuity was only partially accepted and formulated in a general way within the Final Document. Nevertheless, the possibility was left that after the CSCE, periodic meetings of representatives of the foreign ministries of the participating countries would be held, with the decision on the final solution to the issue of continuity being postponed for the first meeting of this kind in Belgrade, in mid-1977. The position was adopted that the next meeting of CSCE in Belgrade should be held first at the level of experts, and subsequently at the level of representatives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[44]

It was on the night of July 20/21, 1975 that the question of continuity was "taken off" the agenda, and the unexpectedly long second phase of the CSCE was finally completed. The next phase lasted only three days. It was held from July 30 to August 1, 1975, in Helsinki's "Finlandia" palace . It had a mostly ceremonial character and was reduced to the formal adoption of the decisions made and the signing of the final documents by the heads of states participating in the meeting.[45] It was opened by the president of the host country, Urho Kekkonen, in the presence

42 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the CSCE, October 13, 1975

43 = = AY-837-I-2/63. Report on the CSCE, Continuity Conferences, 8 August 1975.

44 = = DAMFA-PA/1975/181/437435. Continuity and further tasks. CSCE, September 30, 1975.

45 = = DAMFA-PA/1975/181/437-439. Information about the III phase of CSCE, held in Helsinki from July 30 to August 1, 1975

of the highest representatives of European countries, the USA, and Canada. "Europe is entering a new era," said the Finnish president, then added: "This Conference is unique and incomparable with anything previous in the history of Europe."[46]

All the leaders of the countries participating in the CSCE unanimously supported the statement of the Finnish president. In his speech, Josip Broz Tito, on the other hand, emphasized the terms of the Conference that Yugoslavia had particularly pushed for in Helsinki. He characterized the CSCE as a "democratic dialogue of equal participants, both big and small" and expressed his belief that this meeting would be recorded in history both as a "turning point in Europe's turning toward coexistence and peace," but also as a meeting "of importance not only for Europe, but also for the whole world." The Conference "must not represent the end, but only the beginning of a process," Tito pointed out.[47]

That said, Tito and his collaborators saw the basic weakness of the Final Act from Helsinki in the fact that, given that it represented a compromise of three global political approaches (East, West, and Third World), it was too general, broadly formulated, imprecise, vague, and based on half-hearted solutions. That seemed understandable to some extent, because the complex matter that was discussed required that a general agreement in principle be reached first, only then moving on to its concretization. Therefore, great hopes were placed on the next meeting in Belgrade in 1977, at which one could expect concrete treatment of each special group of issues that were tentatively regulated by the Helsinki Final Act.[48]

= = = Conclusion

The hopes of Yugoslav officials and other European non-aligned or neutral countries—regarding the expediency and efficiency of the continuous and organized performance of CSCE participants—did not come true and did not prove to be realistic. In this sense, the Belgrade Conference in 1977 had an exclusively demonstrative character and made no essential contribution to the resolution of any significant issue that was on the agenda. The outcome of subsequent conferences on European security and cooperation was similar. The return of interventionism on the European political scene demanded new answers from Yugoslavia. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations after a sudden complication (due to harsh Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia) coincided with the establishment of a global political atmosphere of détente, as well as with the increasingly visible determination of the Yugoslav leadership to build a new model

46 = = AY-837-I-2/63.The third phase of CSCE Notes on preparations for the third phase of the CSCE, November 9, 1975.

47 = = AY-837-I-2/63. President Tito's speech at the CSCE in Helsinki, July 31, 1975.

48 = = DAMFA-PA/1976/184/450704. Some current questions about the implementation of the Final Document of the Helsinki Conference and the Belgrade meeting of CSCE, February 23, 1976.

of national security within the framework of achieving pan-European security, which paved the way for the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. During the Conference in Helsinki from July 1973 to August 1975, Yugoslavia, together with a group of European non-aligned and neutral countries, made significant contributions toward freeing this Conference from the antagonistic frame of bloc confrontations and toward approaching the solution of key international problems through democratic dialogue of the participants. The Yugoslav government placed great importance on the outcome of the CSCE, because they believed that this meeting could potentially play a very important role: both within the reaffirmation of the basic premise of the policy of non-alignment, as well as in the efforts to strengthen the European component of Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia showed a special interest in solving questions of the inviolability of borders and provided a favorable outcome for the debate on the necessity of linking the questions of European security with the security of the Mediterranean.

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Keywords

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diplomacy, non-aligned, Tito, Yugoslavia



„Fragment-K": Slovak-Hungarian bilingual samizdat booklets from Czechoslovakia.

Photo by Katalin Erdei (ÁBTL–III.–2.3.–106.3.1.)

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/// Milán Pap

=== Deal-makers, Human Rights Activists, and the Everyday Politics of the Helsinki Process

/// A BOOKREVIEW ON

Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds.
The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990.

Berghahn Books, 2019. pp. 380



Abstract

This review examines *The CSCE and the end of the cold war: diplomacy, societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, edited by Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (Berghahn Books, 2019). The volume brings together scholars from Europe and North America to explore the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its 1975 Helsinki Final Act through three thematic clusters: diplomatic agency, transnational activism, and national case studies. The editors explicitly critique the "Kissingerization" of Cold War historiography, advocating instead for a bottom-up perspective attentive to mid-level diplomats, activists, and transnational networks. The review highlights the volume's methodological innovations, particularly its prosopographical approach to diplomatic negotiations and its use of previously inaccessible archival materials. However, it identifies a significant

cations. However, it became the longest-running and most influential such journal, with twenty-eight issues published by the end of 1989. The editors even undertook to compile a magazine with a different profile, entitled *Máshonnan Beszélő* (Speaking from Elsewhere).[2] Even so, its circulation was not high; the first issue had a print run of 1,500 copies and was produced on a stencil machine, while later issues still only reached an average of 2,000–2,500 copies. They typically did not reach beyond an intellectual readership, although in 1989—when the party-state press control system was barely functioning anymore—the last illegal issue was printed in 8,000 copies.

Since *Beszélő* was an illegal newspaper, it did not apply for or receive a publishing license, although the editors—in an unusual and courageous way—listed their names in the imprint. It was not the first such publication in Hungary nor in the Soviet bloc, where illegal publications proliferated after the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Between 1976 and 1989, more than two dozen journals, usually appearing in only a few hundred copies and often consisting of only one or two issues, were produced under conspiratorial circumstances: at homes, illegally in the country. This was the so-called "second publicity," which in a broad sense included not only these periodicals but also independent book publishers and events (such as exhibitions) organized by various dissident organizations, most of which reached a limited audience.

In contrast, the so-called first publicity encompassed everything that happened with the permission and knowledge of the authorities. Therefore, in this study, we will use the term "official publicity" as a synonym for this sphere. Until 1986, press administration issues in Hungary were not regulated by law but by lower-level legislation, while party supervision of the press was not based on party resolutions. All newspapers, magazines, and books were subject to licensing and, in addition to the officially non-existent party and state censorship, editorial rooms also had to have their own supervisory body and publisher. Nevertheless, Kadarian cultural and information policy—usually described by the differentiated practice identified with the phrase "3T" (*támogatott*, *tűrt*, *tiltott* [supported, tolerated, prohibited]) and associated with the name of György Aczél—created a relatively broad spectrum of public discourse, which sought to serve a wide range of political and public needs: from small-circulation newspapers and intellectual broadcasts open to the world and selectively rich in information, to much more controlled forums aimed at the masses. Second publicity rejected this complex system based on compromise, self-censorship, and concessions.

2 = = The different title clearly indicated that the editors wanted to implement different editorial principles with this publication. While *Beszélő* published materials from foreign newspapers only in very exceptional cases, *Máshonnan Beszélő* sought to remedy this basic stance, which some of the editors considered provincial, by translating foreign publications. Kis, *Szabadságra ítélve* [Sentenced to freedom], 232.

My specific question is: what was the intellectual horizon of the texts published in the second publicity, based on the selection of Western authors? Who was included in the pages of illegal publications, and with what content? To what extent did the composition of the group of authors thus emerging differ from that of the first publicity? Or was the difference not in the individuals themselves, but in the specific works and the editorial attitude?

Hereinafter, I will examine the oppositional public sphere of the 1980s from the perspective of Western—or more precisely non-Eastern and non-Central European[3]—sources used in their samizdat publications. Our conclusions will be drawn with the help of analysis of and comparison with the above-described first publicity. Which authors did samizdat editors find most suitable for describing the world of socialism, counterbalancing and discrediting the official narratives? The analysis does not focus on the main samizdat periodical, because *Beszélő* largely remained faithful to the program defined in its first issue: "Beszélő will discuss unusual events: when one or more people break the customary rules of interaction between those in power and their subjects, defy offensive orders, invoke their rights, and exert pressure on their superiors..."[4]

The editors therefore aimed at creating a second public sphere, which soon began to monitor developments throughout the region.[5] However, it is difficult to discern from the published material what Western ideas and authors they considered important. What does the author's choice of a quote from Walt Whitman or Søren Kierkegaard[6] as a motto reveal about their thoughts, beyond their erudition and knowledge of world literature and philosophy? The mention of Western sources and connections is inevitable in certain topics, as the entire activity—like the domestic peace movement—developed in complex formulas, partly on the brinks of legality and illegality, amid negotiations between official institutions and grassroots initiatives. Or what should we distil from Ambrus Oltványi mentioning John Rawls' theory of justice[7]—which, beyond philosophical publications, was also discussed in the relatively widely circulated magazines and programs of the first publicity?[8]

The study of orientations and motivations is much better served by the special venture of *Beszélő*, which was created with the intention of strengthening the international horizons of samizdat readers: "In the heroic age of samizdat, during

3 = = Therefore, the analysis includes authors from the Global South, but not Eastern and Central European emigrants who had to leave their country in the 1970s and 1980s.

4 = = Editors of Beszélő, *Lapunk elé* [Prologue to our journal], 4.

5 = = Danyi, "A lokális eseménytől" [From local event], 66–98.

6 = = Garzó, "Éhség és terror" [Hunger and terror], 79; Szilágyi, "Az irónia rekordereként" [As the record holder of irony], 89.

7 = = Oltványi, "A közel- és távolabbi" [About the near and far], 83.

8 = = See Ludassy, "Szabadság vagy egyenlőség?" [Liberty or equality], 23–36.

the era of typewritten publications, there was a periodical series called *Kelet-Európai Figyelő* (Eastern European Observer), whose editors sought to convey the democratic culture of our region to Hungarian readers. When *Beszélő* was launched in the fall of 1981, we thought that the magazine could take on this task as well."[9] This publication ran for a total of seven issues between 1985 and 1988. The first three issues were edited strictly in the spirit outlined in the introduction, in which, with a few exceptions, writings of authors in exile or internal dissidents were collected, but subsequently the number of Western and non-European authors increased. Therefore, we are able to examine which Western authors were featured in this forum, and to what extent the circle of authors and their selected works in the samizdat differed from what we find in the first publicity. We supplement this with an analysis of the list of books regularly reviewed in *Beszélő* and published as samizdat in the 1980s—many of which were published by the most active samizdat 'agent', ÁB Független Kiadó, and also with the offerings of the so-called Rajk boutique[10] advertised in *Beszélő*.

= = = Parallels

Milovan Đilas's book *The New Class* was published in Hungarian in 1961. Following the official news agency MTI, the non-party *Magyar Nemzet* labeled the publication a "defamatory anti-communist book" in January of that year, reporting on the fact that the six-year sentence Đilas had received for smuggling the manuscript out of prison for publication in the West was reduced and he was released on parole.[11] However, the principles of Hungarian and Yugoslav information policy were not so far apart that anyone could have gotten their hands on the book in Kádár's Hungary; the party publishing house, which changed its name from Szikra to Kossuth in 1956, printed only three hundred copies of the rebellious Yugoslav communist's[12] critical thoughts on the system.

This was the first item on the list of closed edition books from Kossuth Publishing House, which initially only 257 people—party and state leaders—could access. Once the series proved successful, the number of copies was increased to 400–500 over the course of the decade, and the number of people eligible to receive them may have been triple that. Then, the Agitation and Propaganda Committee (APC) of

9 = = Editors of Máshonnan Beszélő, "Szerkesztői köszöntő" [Editorial welcome], 4.

10 = = Samizdat journals and books could be purchased at private places, e. g., homes. The most famous such place of distribution was the flat of László Rajk, Jr.—the son of the former Minister of the Interior who had been convicted and executed in a 1949 show trial—in Galamb Street, Budapest, before Rajk was forced to move out from the flat in January 1983.

11 = = Anonymous, "Feltételesen szabadlábra helyezték Gyilaszt" ["Đilas was conditionally released"], *Magyar Nemzet*, January 21, 1961, 2.

12 = = In 1962, a year after the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Đilas wrote his own criticism of Stalin as well with the title *Conversations with Stalin*. This resulted in his third trial and imprisonment.

the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) decided to distinguish between closed works and those subject to slightly less stringent scrutiny (mainly by domestic authors). The basic intention was to inform the inner circle to strengthen their willingness and ability to debate at a time when there was much talk about the struggle between the two world systems, and this was mostly mentioned in the context of its main front line having shifted from direct military confrontation to the field of economic and ideological competition. The series should "include publications that inform the leading party and state cadres about opposing views, ideological trends, propaganda directed against us, and hostile (anti-Marxist, bourgeois) ideological attacks," summarized a 1971 report submitted to the APC.[13]

A review of the list of titles published over the course of roughly a decade and a half[14] demonstrates that Kossuth brought the ideas of numerous Western authors to the Kadarian elite, alongside a not-insignificant body of dissident and émigré literature. These included politicians (Henry Kissinger, Anthony Eden, Zbigniew Brezinski, Allen Dulles, Franz Joseph Strauss, André Malraux, Averell Harriman), diplomats and political analysts (Denna Frank Fleming, Thomas Finletter, Isaac Deutscher), and philosophers and other social scientists (Jean-Paul Sartre, Walt Rostow, André Gorz, Gustav Wetter, Régis Debray). The latter represented influential trends of their time, such as existentialism and the theory of industrial society, which were fiercely debated by defenders of Marxism-Leninism. This closed series also featured key figures in Western left-wing debates, such as "1968ers" (Che Guevara, Herbert Marcuse, Cohn Bendit) and key documents, such as the writings of the Il Manifesto group and the *Capitalist Manifesto*.

There are plenty of names on this list that were often mentioned in the official—so-called first—publicity of the party state, and the thoughts of several of them were disputed there with the public being unable to read their original writings or having access only to their less problematic texts. Yet this list is very similar to the group of names drawn up by the venture of the opposition to that party state in the 1980s, which circumvented the licensing authorities—or the formally non-existent censorship—in spite of the fact that the circumstances, the international background, and the motivation were completely different. After all, Kossuth's "closed" list was compiled by the party leadership with the aim of legitimizing their power, and the selection and publication of works took place within a controlled frame-

13 = = HU-MNL-OL-M–KS-288/41/167. Report on publication and distribution of books classified as "closed" and "internal distribution," October 4, 1971.

14 = = See Cseh, Kalmár and Pór, *Zárt, bizalmas, számozott [Closed, confidential, numbered]*, 369; Sipos, "Az államszocialista ancien régime" [The attributes of power in the state socialist ancien régime], 16–39. Due to the specific nature of the study (i.e., using content analysis) and therefore the large number of works referenced during the analysis, the footnotes in the study differ from the Chicago Manual of Style convention in that the referenced works (except daily newspaper articles) are abbreviated even when it is first mentioned.

work. The series came into being at a time when the "Soviet galaxy" believed that it could turn the dispute between the two world systems to its advantage,[15] and furthermore that it could present a vision of the future—a utopia. For that reason, it had to prepare its own elite—but only the members of its elite—so that it could hold its own in the international debate. Thus, the focus was primarily on the opponent: the intellectual and political sphere of the West. The samizdat of the 1980s wanted to break down the walls of this "closed" system with the aim of delegitimizing the regime, so the selection and publication of works was conspiratorial and uncontrolled by the authorities. By this time, the "Soviet galaxy" had already lost the utopia of both the Stalinist and Khrushchev eras,[16] and the opposition, which had built regional networks[17] and carried out a series of knowledge transfers even regarding samizdat-making,[18] focused on exposing the grim reality of the system. Therefore, its focus inevitably turned inwards, as evidenced not only by the larger proportion of authors from East Central and Eastern Europe, but also by the fact that voices from the West and the Global South also spoke about existing socialism.

Samizdat literature followed a different pattern.

= = = Máshonnan Beszélő—Authors and Topics

Máshonnan Beszélő (Speaking from Elsewhere) released thematic issues, with the first issue providing a mixed, essentially Central European literary overview. Most of the authors were already living in the West at that time (Milan Kundera, Zdeněk Mlynář, Adam Zagajewski) or were published there as "tamizdat" (Varlam Salahov, Józef Lipski). Their writings could not be published in their own countries, at least during certain periods, and one of them, Václav Havel, was serving a prison sentence. The only Western author was the Irishman Samuel Beckett, who dedicated his theatre scene to Havel, while Havel's "response" also appeared in this issue.

Issues 2 and 3 also featured only one article each by Western authors, the former dealing with Polish issues that were also of key importance for domestic opposition, and the latter seeking to confront readers with the realities of the Soviet Union. However, half of the authors in Issue 4 were Westerners, and most of the articles dealt with the division of Europe and the Cold War. The next issue looked

15 = = According to Kalmár, the Soviet Union—as the center of one of the historical galaxies—offered (and forced) an alternative, competing model of globalization and modernization to the states within its sphere of influence and those it tried to pull into it. See Kalmár, *In the Pull of Historical Galaxies,* 81–88.

16 = = Takács, "The Vanishing Soviet Utopia," 143–47.

17 = = Mitrovits, *Tiltott kapcsolat* [Forbidden relationship]; Danyi, *Az írógép és az utazótáska* [The typewriter and the travel bag], Burgoyne et al., "Unlicensed and unbound", 415–43.

18 = = Danyi, "Harisnya, ablakkeret és szabad gondolat" [Stockings, window frames, and free thought], 92–127.

beyond Europe; Latin America—above all communist Cuba—dominated, but some articles also touched upon the Middle East and the Southeast Asia: i.e., those parts of the Global South with which the socialist world had the most to do. Here, more than two-thirds (72 percent) of the authors came from outside the Soviet bloc. The next topic—at the end of 1986—was understandably the revolution of 1956, with thirteen articles by nine authors (62 percent of those published) coming from the West. The last issue, which was published in 1988 and discussed conflicts raging in the Soviet bloc despite the officially proclaimed Leninist nationality policy, once again returned to "internal" voices, with a mere four Western authors (29 percent) contributing.

Altogether a total of thirty-six articles by Western and Third World authors appeared in the seven issues. Two of these thinkers also appeared in the "closed" series of Kossuth: Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, as a researcher of Soviet regimes, was close to politics in the 1960s but took on a government role in the second half of the 1970s. The other was André Gorz, an Austro-French philosopher close to Sartre. From further samizdat books we can add the Marxist historian Isaac Deutcher. At the same time, Kossuth also published works by numerous authors, from Walt Rostow to Raymond Aron, who could have confidently claimed a place for themselves in *Beszélő*, provided it had been prepared some twenty years earlier.

Let us take a closer look at these authors. What could have been the main criteria of the editors' choice? How familiar were their names and works to readers of the first publicity? Were there any overlaps, or did samizdat make a completely new circle of authors and universe of texts available in Hungarian?

Looking at the professions of those thirty-six mentioned, writers and social scientists are in the majority (fifteen, or 42 percent, of each). The latter group includes historians, political scientists, economists, and philosophers. In contrast to Kossuth's "closed" circulation volumes, the number of politicians and diplomats is low, at only three (8 percent), while two other authors were journalists and one was an actress. The latter, Simone Signoret, was cited because she spent New Year's Eve of 1956 in Moscow with her husband, Yves Montand, who was treated as a star in the Soviet bloc during the Khrushchev Thaw.[19]

Thirteen writings of the above thirty-six in *Máshonnan Beszélő* were also mentioned in the first publicity, meaning that the "legal press" responded to them in some form, even if only in a paragraph of an article discussing a wider or different topic, or "hidden" in a simple news report. However, only in two cases—both literary works—was the original text made available to the wider audience. One was Beckett, whose official reputation underwent a significant transformation between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. During these one and a half decades, he turned from a nihilist totally rejecting all human values into a humanist concerned about the

19 = = Anonymous, "When a Distant Friend Sings".

fate of mankind. His most famous play, *Waiting for Godot*, opened in the Theatre of Nations in 1975, when it moved from Paris to Warsaw and was held in the Soviet bloc for the first time.[20] Several of Beckett's plays were also performed in small auditoriums but were still reviewed by critics. The Hungarian press repeatedly reported on the Avignon Theater Festival,[21] where it was performed in 1982. However, *Catastrophe* was not published until 1985; *Új Írás* undertook the task, in the same year as *Máshonnan Beszélő*. The play speaks about oppression and resistance, but so metaphorically that editor-in-chief Ferenc Juhász saw no risk in publishing it. The scene takes place on a stage, where the director and his assistant engage in dialogue while they adjust the posture and clothing of the central figure. The latter, who may be a symbol of the oppressed nation(s), is portrayed as humiliated and tormented as possible, but at the very end, the character shows self-awareness, even if only through a gesture.

The two translations of the text differ,[22] but the important point is rather that *Új Írás* does not discuss the background of Beckett's work: namely, that it was dedicated to Vaclav Havel, one of the main organizers of Charta '77, who was imprisoned at the time. As the very first piece in *Máshonnan Beszélő*—and one that stands out from the rest of the issue—it can be seen as a symbolic choice and a programmatic work for the project: a gesture of resistance by the intellectuals of Central and Eastern Europe. The schema is more banal in the case of the other common piece. At the time of its first Hungarian publication, the Cuban Heberto Padilla was on the side of Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution of 1959; his works were published in several magazines (*Új Írás*, *Nagyvilág*), and in the first half of the 1960s, they were also featured in several poetic and musical performances. His poem *In Hard Times*, also published in samizdat, was featured in the program of Egyetemi Színpad, the student theatre of Eötvös Loránd University and the Department of Spanish Language and Literature at ELTE (*Kígyóölő ének*) in 1969.[23] After his arrest in 1971,[24] Padilla's poems also became undesirable.

In four further cases, the complete work itself was not available, but certain reviews or evaluations could be read. Simone Signoret published her memoirs in 1975 under the title *Nostalgia Isn't What It Used to Be*, which was published in Hungary in the time of the regime change.[25] The excerpt published in *Máshonnan Beszélő* covers their experiences in Moscow, particularly their conversation with Khrushchev in the presence of Soviet party leaders at the theatre where Montand

20 = = Takács, "Színházpolitika" [Theater policy], 70, 76.

21 = = Anonymous, "Kabuki módra" [Kabuki style], 41.; Ránki, "IN és OFF," [IN and OFF], 10–15.

22 = = Beckett, "Katasztrófa" [Catastrophe], 5–7; Beckett, "Katasztrófa" [Catastrophe], 52–55.

23 = = Anonymous, "Egyetemi Színpad" [University stage], 15.

24 = = Echevarría, "Heberto Padilla."

25 = = Signoret, *Már a nosztalgia* [Nostalgia isn't].

performed for a Soviet audience.[26] She also recalled their opposing assessments of the 1956 revolution. In contrast, when the volume was published, the Hungarian press focused on the scandalous parts, instead of the 1956 references: how the French actress almost failed in her role as Lady Macbeth in London, and how Marilyn Monroe hit on her husband in the US during the shooting of the film *Let's Make Love*.[27]

The novels of Mario Vargas Llosa were published in Hungarian in various volumes following *The Time of the Hero* in 1971.[28] *The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta*, excerpts of which were published in Hungary only after the fall of communism, depicts the debates of the Peruvian Left with both unvarnished honesty and sympathy for a young Trotskyist revolutionary. *Magyar Nemzet* provided a relatively detailed review about the novel, while the foreign literature magazine *Nagyvilág* provided a briefer one.[29] Guillermo Cabrera Infante, like Padilla, was initially a supporter of Castro's regime, but gradually distanced himself from it, living in Europe and working in Hollywood in the 1970s. His literary discovery in Hungary came late, after the turn of the millennium, but one of his stories was included in a 1966 Cuban anthology.[30]

His novel *View of Dawn in the Tropics*, from which the editors of *Beszélő* chose absurd one-minute sketches of revolutionary Cuba,[31] was characterized in *Új Írás* as a work offering a glimpse into the sultry nightlife of the final days of the Batista dictatorship.[32] The case of the fourth author, Zbigniew Brzezinski, is somewhat special; his views as a political and social scientist, later as a politician, had been regularly debated since the 1960s. The specific article from *Máshonnan Beszélő* was also criticized by *Béke és Szocializmus* and *Párttörténeti Közlemények*.[33] Yet it was only two years later that, at the very dawn of the transition, he was invited to give a lecture at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) at the request of the Hungarian Political Science Association.[34]

The above examples reveal that the same text was interesting to the editors of the second and first publications from different perspectives. The former sought out and highlighted parts that provided insight into and criticism of the socialist system(s), while the latter reported on motifs that did not involve criticism of the system.

26 = = Signoret, "Párizsi ősz" [Autumn in Paris], 114–124.

27 = = For the most detailed report, see Anonymous, "Megbukott a Macbethben" [Failed in Macbeth], 24.

28 = = Vargas Llosa, *A város és a kutyák* [The time of the hero].

29 = = Ortutay, "Lurigancho.", *Magyar Nemzet*, June 30, 1986, 2.; Anonymous, "Hírek a világból" [News from the world], 142.

30 = = Szerdahelyi, "Cabrera Infante", 1226.

31 = = Cabrera Infante, "Hajnali látkép" [View of the dawn], 9.

32 = = Bueno, "Széljegyzetek" [Sidenotes], 90.

33 = = Dackiewicz, "Meghaladni Jaltát?" [Getting over Yalta?], 22–24.; Nagy, "Jalta", 147–48.

34 = = Galló, "Zbigniew Brzezinski előadása" [The lecture of Zbigniew Brzezinski], 97–98.

The remaining seven works available in samizdat (by Timothy Garton Ash, Jorge Semprún, Jorge Edwards, Robert S. Leiken, William Shawcross, Hannah Arendt, and Alexander Benningsen) were only mentioned in the first publicity. Nevertheless, all of them also appeared in the official public sphere in connection with their other works. Some were known for their books, plays, and films; the best known of these, alongside Vargas Llosa, Beckett, and Signoret, was Jorge Semprún.

The Holocaust novel *Long Voyage* by French communist Semprún was published in Hungarian within a year[35] and was followed by others, but *Máshonnan Beszélő* turned to *Autobiography of Federico Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain* from 1977. They focused on the passage in which the author—visiting the Congress of the Cuban Communist Party—writes about Castro, including the ironic moment when the Cuban leader's "cult of personality" was revealed on the basketball court, where opponent players were painstakingly careful not to prevent him from scoring points.[36] Besides the works of Cuban Padilla and Infante, a story by Chilean author Jorge Edwards was also published in Hungarian in *Nagyvilág*.[37] However, *Máshonnan Beszélő* was interested in the work—in which Edwards recounted how he became persona non grata in Havana as a diplomat of the left-wing Allende government— and particularly in the details of the Cuban propaganda campaign against the Peruvian writer Pablo Neruda.[38]

Others appeared in the Hungarian journals and magazines only through more or less detailed descriptions of their works, two of them with articles republished in review columns in Hungarian. William Shawcross, an English journalist and expert on Southeast Asia who visited Hungary in 1971,[39] was of interest both to the editors of *Máshonnan Beszélő* and to other Hungarian newspapers because of his writings on Cambodia. The latter could use his writings criticizing American foreign policy,[40] with *Nemzetközi Szemle* reprinting an assessment of Reagan,[41] while the samizdat newspaper highlighted passages about the Khmer Rouge regime.[42] An article by Hannah Arendt, who became world-famous for her description of totalitarian dictatorships—applied to both fascist and communist systems—was also published in Hungarian. The 1956 issue of *Máshonnan Beszélő* published an excerpt

35 = = Semprún, *A nagy utazás* [Long voyage].

36 = = Semprún, "Federico Sánchez," 18–20.

37 = = Edwards, "Vasárnapok a menhelyen" [Sundays at the shelter], 840–44.

38 = = Edwards, "Persona non grata," 21–22.

39 = = Anonymous, "A Sunday Times munkatársa Baranyában" [A Sunday Times correspondent in Baranya], *Dunántúli Napló*, May 14, 1971, 4.

40 = = Bőgös, "Kétszeres szembesítés" [Double confrontation], *Magyar Hírlap*, April 13, 1980, 2; Pomroy, "Az őrült elmélet" [The consequences of the crazy theory], 141–43.

41 = = Shawcross, "Reagan utazása" [Reagan's journey], 16–19.

42 = = Shawcross, "Kambodzsa temetése" [The funeral of Cambodgia], 97–106.

from Arendt's 1958 essay analyzing the lessons of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956: a great taboo in Kadarist Hungary.[43]

In spite of that, Arendt was definitely not subject to a publication ban from the early 1960s onwards, and her works—such as *The Human Condition* or *Eichmann in Jerusalem*—were regularly mentioned, while *Valóság* republished her essay on Pope John XXIII in 1966.[44] Even Arendt's main opus, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, was discussed in several debate articles written from a Marxist perspective. György Márkus presented the essence of Arendt's concept of totalitarianism as an "abstract, metaphysical, and fanatically hateful" anti-communist declaration,[45] while in the 1980s, social psychologist Ferenc Erős invoked Arendt to characterize solely Hitler's fascism—this time without condemnation.[46] A similar pattern can be observed in the case of historian and journalist Timothy Garton Ash: his writings were regularly quoted in the official Hungarian press when he analyzed Western conditions critically, and then at the end of the decade, his writings became interesting because of the idea of Central Europe. Ash maintained active contacts with the democratic opposition in Hungary, participated in the counter-forum of the European Cultural Forum organized as part of the Helsinki process in 1985.[47] *Máshonnan Beszélő* also published his lecture given there.[48]

= = = Titles Nowhere to Be Found in the First Publicity

What can be set out about the authors of those twenty-three works which were selected by *Máshonnan Beszélő* and were never mentioned in the official publicity? This list includes well-known names whose literary output was widely known to the Hungarian public. These include two South American novelists, the magical realist Jorge Luis Borges and Gabriel García Márquez, as well as the existentialist Albert Camus. The British poet Stephen Spender was already well-known in Hungary before 1945, and he also visited Budapest in 1947 in a visit organized by the British Council.[49] Camus and Spender were important to samizdat editors because of their articles and speeches that were written and told in connection with the 1956

43 = = Arendt, "Totalitarian Imperialism," 5–43: Arendt, "A magyar forradalom" [The Hungarian Revolution], 88–94.

44 = = Arendt, "A keresztény pápa" [The Christian pope], 120–21.

45 = = Márkus, "Szocializmus" [Socialism], 276.

46 = = Erős, "A fasizmus" [On the social psychology of fascism], 280, 284–85.

47 = = In October and November 1985, the European Cultural Forum—as the first such event in the Soviet bloc in the history of the Helsinki follow-up conferences—took place in Budapest. During the Forum, members of the opposition and foreign sympathizers organized alternative events in private homes. Müller, *Európai Kulturális Fórum* [The European Cultural Forum].

48 = = Ash, "Pár gondolat…" [Few thoughts…], 99–101.

49 = = Anonymous, "Stephen Spender Budapesten" [Stephen Spender in Budapest], 92.

revolution. Spender's apolitical poems were published in the late 1950s, even though *Jelenkor* referred to him as one of the most active poets who "unhesitatingly put their pens at the service of the increasingly intense Cold War, anti-Soviet, imperialist propaganda of the post-war years."[50] Some works by Reinaldo Arenas and Archibald MacLeish were also published in Hungarian, while Hugh Seton-Watson's studies were not translated, but were referenced by historians; he even gave a lecture at the Institute of History of HAS in 1969.[51]

The next group of samizdat authors includes social scientists and journalists whose "underground articles" were not even mentioned in the "censored press," but whose other publications were reported or debated. However, these latter writings typically covered different topics from what samizdat touched upon. Demographer and political economist Nicholas Eberstadt's observations on China were available to a wider audience, while his work describing the state of Soviet healthcare in very critical terms appeared in samizdat.[52] Political scientist Fred Halliday's analyses of Iran, Ethiopia, and the "mini-Cold War" were used, rather than those of Afghanistan.[53] Salvador de Madariaga, a Spanish poet and philosopher living in exile in England, was quoted in response to one of his articles, rather than his 1956 poem entitled "*Epitaph in Budapest*." French philosopher Claude Lefort's thoughts on 1956 are also not reflected, but rather his study on the sociological examination of democratic systems.[54] André Gorz's views were debated in numerous journals without translating the original texts, while Swiss journalist Viktor Meier's 1983 article on ethnic tensions in Kosovo was not cited. The weekly *Magyarország* instead used his West German publication as a credible and impartial Western voice on the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania.[55] One must add in this case that the time factor, the development of Hungarian–Romanian relations, and domestic public pressure played a significant role.[56]

Six names remain on our list, which appeared only in the samizdat publication—meaning that only one-sixth of the authors of *Máshonnan Beszélő* were not from the Soviet bloc. Among them were two Cubans: Modesto Maidique, an economist known to few, and Armando Valladares, another "public enemy" of the Castro regime who was convicted of terrorism, and whom *Népszabadság* presented

50 = = Szili, "Mozgolódók" [The restless], 45.

51 = = K. E., "Nemzetközi kapcsolatok." [International relations], 368.

52 = = Eberstadt, "Amit most tudunk" [What we know at the moment], 122–23.; Ebestadt, "Egészségügyi válság" [Health crisis], 90–96.

53 = = Gellért, "Gazdag örökség" [Rich heritage], 11.; Szalim, "Az objektivizmus" [The seemingness of objectivity], 137–39.

54 = = Anonymous, "Külföldi folyóiratok" [Foreign journals], 782.

55 = = Anonymous, "Két mércével mérnek" [They measure with double standards], 18.

56 = = Földes, "Magyarország, Románia" [Hungary, Romania], 359–92.

in accordance with the official Cuban narrative still in 1988.[57] Of the remaining group of two English and two American historians and political scientists, three—Anthony Upton, Mark Baskin, and Melvin Croan—can be assumed not to have reached the horizon of Hungarian social scientists.[58] The exception is Louis Fitzgibbon, who touched on a particularly sensitive topic—the Katyń massacre—which the official Soviet stance defined as a Nazi war crime. Other samizdat publishers also viewed the Katyń issue as a serious matter that could undermine the legitimacy of the regime.[59]

= = = Western Authors of Samizdat Publishing Houses

In this chapter, we expand our inquiry on Western samizdat authors with the samizdat supply published in the first issue of *Beszélő* in 1981 and the most important offers of samizdat publishers between 1980 and 1987. An announcement in Issue 1 of *Beszélő* listed the volumes of "manuscript literature" available at the Rajk Boutique on Galamb Street. Hungarian authors dominated this list of seventy-seven items with nearly fifty writings, and we can find only five Western names, which was merely 6–7 percent of the selection.[60] Fred Halliday's work on Afghanistan was later published in *Máshonnan Beszélő*. The case of the other journalist, Oriana Fallaci, is somewhat special, because the Italian reporter had a kind of cult following even within the Soviet bloc, and Hungarian journalists could also mention her among their professional role models.[61] The Walesa interview, which could be purchased for thirty forints, could not be published in the first publicity, although official information policy played on several strings in connection with the Polish crisis and Solidarity. It was not uncommon for defamatory material to appear in forums reaching the widest audience, while a more balanced picture of the processes in Poland could be presented via channels with a narrower reach.[62] Still, the only mention of this interview, which ultimately had its roots in the Fallaci cult, suggests a kind of—perhaps deliberate, perhaps accidental—editorial negligence. *Magyarország* reviewed the star reporter's article about her own working methods, which included a reference to the 1981 Walesa interview that was not published in Hungary: "My recent interview with Walesa begins exactly as the meeting began: with an

57 = = N. Cs. [Initials]. "Egy szélhámos karrierje" [The career of a swindler]. *Népszabadság*, February 6, 1988, 2.

58 = = Upton's research on Finland only entered Hungarian historical thinking in a review article published after the turn of the millennium. See Vares, "Sikertörténet" [Success story], 134–35.

59 = = Zawodny, *Halál az erdőben* [Death in the forest].

60 = = Anonymous, "2. jegyzék. 1981. Július" [2nd catalogue. July 1981], 107–8.

61 = = Szathmári, "Kik a példaképek?" [Who are the role models?], 137.

62 = = Mitrovits, *A szocializmus csapdájában* [In the trap of socialism], 352–57.

argument, and ends as the meeting ended: with the unexpected formation of a new friendship."[63]

From the two historical works, Bill Lomax's *Hungary 1956* was a regular feature in the columns of *Beszélő*. Understandably, before January 1989 it was impossible to dispute the evaluation of 1956 that formed the ideological-political foundation of the Kádár regime;[64] therefore, before 1988 Lomax was only mentioned in the first publicity in exceptional cases, and with a disparaging, propagandistic tone. Thus, the compilation of *Népszabadság* entitled *A tények válaszolnak* (The Facts Answer), prepared for the thirtieth anniversary of the Revolution, used a passage from his book to support the claim that "reactionary" forces had also organized themselves during the revolution and considered Cardinal Mindszenty their legitimate leader.[65] László Eörsi was the first to cite Lomax as a credible historical source at the end of 1988 in connection with the Kossuth Square massacre of October 25.[66] British historian Robert Conquest published his monograph *The Great Terror* in 1968 on Stalin's show trials of the 1930s.[67] Although violations of the law in the 1950s became a topic that could be cautiously discussed thanks to de-Stalinization, Conquest's book was accepted as a historical source only at the early stage of the regime change in 1988, when Stalin's crimes became the subject of public debate again; an article taken from the Hungarian and Soviet press also refers to it.[68] Conquest's "erroneous" views were publicly criticized on several occasions: for example, his denial of artistic commitment, or the convergence theories of a "well-known anti-communist expert."[69] In this case, the articles taken from the Soviet press also show that the writings that appeared in the wake of Gorbachev's glasnost—especially on Soviet-related topics—also helped to broaden the horizons of Hungarian publicity.

The fourth most expensive item in the boutique's offerings was Arthur Koestler's novel *Darkness at Noon*, which could be purchased for 350 forints. The Hungarian-born author can be compared to George Orwell, whose most important works, *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, were also published as samizdat.[70]

63 = = Fallaci, "Hogyan készítek interjút?" [How do I conduct an interview?], 19.

64 = = Ripp, *Rendszerváltás* [Regime change], 279–81.

65 = = Anonymous, "Az ellenforradalom megítélése (1)" [The assessment of the counter-revolution (1)], *Népszabadság*, October 16, 1986, 6.

66 = = Eörsi, "Kik lőhettek?" [Who could have fired?], 2.

67 = = Conquest, *The Great Terror*.

68 = = Gömöri, "Egy tabu anatómiája" [The anatomy of a taboo], 23; Maluhin, "A hadsereg-parancsnok" [The murder of the army commander], 121–22.

69 = = Lutter, "Elkötelezettség" [Commitment], 136–37; Modrzsinszkaja, "A jelenkori ellen-forradalom," [The anatomy of the ideas of the present counterrevolution], 66.

70 = = Orwell, *Állati gazdaság* [Animal farm]; Orwell, *Ezerkilencszáznyolcvannégy* [Nine-teen eighty-four].

The former, under the title *Állati gazdaság*,[71] was published by Gábor Demszky's AB Független Kiadó, while the latter was published by György Krassó and his Magyar Október Szabadsajtó Kiadó.[72] Both formerly communist writers' names appeared relatively frequently in Hungarian newspapers; even the so-called forbidden works were mentioned. Koestler's well-known work *Darkness at Noon* began to be publicly discussed in the 1980s, following a few scattered references.

Pál E. Fehér, a cultural critic and contributor to both the literary magazines *Kritika* and *Élet és Irodalom* as well as the party daily *Népszabadság*, and who often represented the official position, shared a Soviet assessment of Koestler in *Élet és Irodalom*. According to Fehér, the main problem with the novel—a good two decades after the first wave of de-Stalinization—was not that it revealed the psychology of Stalinist terror and that it "contained a considerable number of serious truths," but rather its timing.[73] The author published it at a moment when it "objectively" caused harm to the anti-fascist alliance of World War II. Although similar opinion could still be read in 1984,[74] by then a different assessment had emerged. Writer and journalist Iván Boldizsár, the editor of the English language cultural country propaganda journal *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, shared an anecdote about the novel. According to this anecdote, he bought it during a more open period,[75] on a trip to Paris in 1946; then in 1949, "G. I."—most likely the social democrat István Gergely—borrowed it from him shortly before his arrest.[76] According to the story, Koestler's novel "prepared" Gergely for state security proceedings, therefore he admitted to all the fabricated charges in the hope of taking the easy way out.[77] After his death in 1983, however, Koestler was assessed in *Nagyvilág* as an important writer who had penned numerous novels. The assessment refuted the claim that the novel's publication had harmed the great cause, as only the 1946 French edition—the one Boldizsár acquired—had a mass impact.[78] The author

71 = = The standard Hungarian translation of the title is *Állatfarm*.

72 = = About Krassó as samizdat publisher, see Danyi, "Polgárjogi harcos" [Civil rights combatant], 200–33.

73 = = E. Fehér, "Nota bene", 6.

74 = = A. G. [Initials], "Folyóiratszemle" [Journal review]. *Magyar Nemzet*, August 17, 1984, 7.

75 = = Takács, "Nyitás és új bezárkózás" [Opening and new isolation], 321–39.

76 = = Boldizsár, known as a "passionate storyteller," is certainly mistaken here. If he indeed lent the book in 1949, it was not shortly before Gergely's arrest, which took place in 1951. He was released in 1955, and his career path under Kádár was not an unusual one either; in 1962, he was appointed head of a department at the government press control agency, the Information Office (Tájékoztatási Hivatal). "Gergely István."

77 = = Boldizsár, "Keser-édesek" [Bittersweet bits], 1394–405.

78 = = Vezér, "Az ismeretlenbe" [In pursuit of the arrow shot into the unknown], 1228–41.

and the novel were included in the 1986 edition of a volume introducing Western Hungarian literature.[79]

1984, the "international Orwell year," was also a watershed in terms of the author's official reputation. Until the 1980s, there was hardly any mention of his works, which were described in 1955 (taken from the Soviet *Novy Mir*) as "arrogantly anti-democratic and anti-Soviet."[80] However the journal *Valóság* in the 1960s referred to *Animal Farm* as "malicious" but "witty" satire,[81] and after a series of references, in 1984 two magazines introduced him as a left-wing intellectual whose polyphonic criticism of oppression had been appropriated and distorted by anti-capitalist propaganda.[82] However, in the case of both Koestler and Orwell, the only way to become acquainted with their fundamental works was through samizdat editions or copies obtained abroad.

Among Western authors published by various samizdat workshops in the 1980s, historical and factual literature dominates. Five authors can be classified in this category, but only the Polish-American Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny can be considered an academic scholar. He switched from a military career to history while in exile and wrote a book about the Soviet mass murder of Polish officers during WWII.[83] As we have seen, the truth about Kaytń was also addressed by *Máshonnan Beszélő*. Isaac Deutscher, a Trotskyist communist who emigrated to England in 1939, wrote monographs on Trotsky and Stalin, but AB Független Kiadó chose his work on the period of de-Stalinization.[84] Deutscher, however, was not an unknown name in Hungary, even though his first study, on Russian Jewry, only became available in Hungarian in 1985.[85] His works on historical and ideological issues were read by intellectuals in Hungary, where his statements were referenced and sometimes even used to support Marxist arguments.[86]

Two of the remaining three works are historical accounts of the East Central European region, dealing with the 1953 uprising in East Berlin and the Yalta World Order.[87] Siegfried Kogelfranz was only mentioned in the first publicity as a West

79 = = Béládi et al., *A nyugati magyar irodalom* [Hungarian literature in the West], 14, 50, 123, 153.

80 = = Rozanov, "Nagy hagyományok" [Great traditions], 484.

81 = = Schaff, "Az egyén" [The individual], 48.

82 = = Köröspataki Kiss, "1984", 42.; Staller, "George Orwell," 24–31.

83 = = Zawodny, *Halál az erdőben* [Death in the forest].

84 = = Deutscher, *Korabeli krónika* [A contemporary chronicle].

85 = = Deutscher, "Az orosz forradalom" [The Russian Revolution], 269–77.

86 = = See Nagy, "A forradalmi út" [Old and new critics of the revolutionary path], 47–48.

87 = = Arnulf Baring, *A kelet-németországi* [The East German]; Kogelfranz, *Jalta öröksége* [The heritage of Yalta].

German journalist[88] working for *Der Spiegel*, while Arnulf Baring, professor at the Free University of Berlin—again, a familiar formula—wrote another publication: an analysis of the internal relations of the Federal Republic of Germany, focusing on the years of the social democratic-liberal government led by Willy Brandt.[89] The hero of Biermann's biography, Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, was far from a taboo figure in Hungary. Even a street bore his name in the Újlipótváros neighborhood of Budapest, together with a memorial tablet. "I would write about Raoul Wallenberg if I were a writer," actress Zsuzsa Gordon told a reporter from *Film–Színház–Muzsika* in 1961. "Raoul Wallenberg was killed. The Arrow Cross killed him," she concluded after her dramatic personal story.[90] Biermann's book could not be published because there could be no mention of Wallenberg's deportation to the Soviet Union and his death. This version first appeared in the columns of *Magyarország* in a letter to the editor published in the summer of 1988.[91]

The name of the authors—more precisely, poets—published (also) as samizdat in the 1980s was well-known to the Hungarian public.[92] Several of Ezra Pound's *Canto*s were available in Hungarian[93] before György Krassó published the translation of his selected poems, first released in Paris.[94] Meanwhile Miklós Haraszti, a dissident thinker and editor, edited essays by Hans Magnus Enzensberger—considered one of the progressive West German poets—that were critical of state socialist Hungary.[95]

= = = Summary—About the Western Orientation of Hungarian Samizdat

In 1985, László Zay, a member of the editorial board of the daily *Magyar Nemzet* and working under the pseudonym Bálint Koppány, wrote a response in the samizdat *Beszélő* to the author publishing under the pseudonym Ilona Bak. Bak had recommended that the public completely reject the official media as a form of resistance.

Ilona Bak could also decide to buy the newspaper and read between the lines. I'm not saying that she would find something to read between the lines every day,

88 = = Miklós, "Egy ellenforradalmi központ anatómiája" [The anatomy of a counter-revolutionary centre], *Népszabadság*, September 18, 1982, 9.

89 = = (bt) [Initials], „Baring: Hatalomváltás A »bonni trojka« kulisszái mögött." [Baring: Change of Power. Behind the Scenes of the 'Bonn Troika'], *Esti Hírlap*, June 19, 1982, 5.

90 = = Lelkes, "Milyen téma" [What topic], 14–15.

91 = = Anonymous, "Budapest 62., Pf. 634" [Budapest 62, PO Box 634], 31.

92 = = See Bart, *Világirodalom* [World literature].

93 = = Pound, "XIII. Canto", 1728–29; Pound, "Nyolcadik Canto" [Eighth canto], 1154–57; Pound, "XLIX. Canto," 213–14; Pound, "LI. Canto," 214–15; Pound, "IV. Canto," 1805–8; Pound, "XX. Canto," 1808–13.

94 = = Pound, *Tizenöt canto* [Fifteen cantos].

95 = = Haraszti, *Hans Magnus Enzensberger*.

but this third press also needs publicity. You can also learn something from the refutations; there are traditions of this even from the time of World War II. Ilona Bak could also find examples of how official replies reveal hidden or more open dissent between the lines. This is something to think about, because even if metaphorical language or hiding between the lines lags behind the bluntness of the second press, still be a lot can be learned this way as well.[96]

Zay partly "spoke to his own side," but what he called the "third press" was noticed not only by his contemporaries, but also by media and history scholars. The terms "third publicity" (*harmadik nyilvánosság*) and "intermediate public sphere" (*köztes nyilvánosság*) is used to describe a segment of the public sphere that belongs to the legal forums but is constantly in conflict due to borderline cases and often shifting or occasional tolerances. This segment is controlled by the authorities, but it is well documented that the content that can be expressed and printed there is wider and more profound than in most other programs and journals.[97] Based on the writings and references in the first publicity of the above-discussed samizdat authors, we are also able to outline these forums of "intermediate publicity" beyond the truly "problematic" papers, like *Mozgó Világ*, *Medventánc*, or *Tiszatáj;*[98] they included literary and intellectual journals such as *Nagyvilág*, *Valóság*, and *Új Írás*, as well as public affairs weeklies such as *Élet és Irodalom*, *Magyarország*, and *Új Tükör*. In fact, even through these journals, a somewhat fainter Soviet "intermediate public sphere" also emerges. In the case of certain sensitive topics—as illustrated by the authors featured in these samizdat publications—it becomes clear that the actors of the first publicity kept a close eye on the Soviet press, and as soon as a topic or author was published there, it served as a reference point and authorization to bring these topics and authors into the domestic discourse.

The intentions behind turning to Western authors were different. Samizdat was not at all Western-oriented, as it did not aim at debate or soft Western transfers; in addition to Hungarian authors, intellectuals with "personal" experiences with state socialism, often living in exile, were the most frequent contributors. Publishers and editors also used writings and volumes from outside the Soviet bloc primarily to discuss the affairs of the region and existing socialism. Although a significant number of literary figures were also featured, with a few exceptions, they were not important as writers but as eyewitnesses who made statements about politics and society. It is therefore not surprising that many of them had once belonged to the movement, which lent credibility to their revelations. Their statements contributed

96 = = Koppány, "A harmadik sajtó" [The third press]. For the article triggering the response, see Bak, "Hogyan szabotálom" [How do I sabotage], 94–96.

97 = = Bajomi-Lázár, *A magyarországi médiaháború* [The Hungarian media war], 18; Németh, *A Mozgó Világ* [The history of the journal Mozgó Világ], 13; Kiss, "Jegyzetek" [Notes], 316.

98 = = Németh, *A Mozgó Világ*; Gyuris, *A Tiszatáj* [Half a century of the journal Tiszatáj].

to the delegitimization of existing socialism, often touching on central taboos that could not be discussed in public or only in certain ways, such as 1956, the Eastern European resistance, and the crimes and dysfunctions of Soviet-type systems.

The decisive difference between the first and the second publicity, therefore, is not that certain authors could not appear in the former. In fact, only about one-sixth of them were not even mentioned in the legal press. Furthermore, many of them were well-known to Hungarian readers, and some or even plenty of their works had been translated or at least reviewed, used in arguments, or debated. Even if a certain work was often mentioned, the selection of publications in *Máshonnan Beszélő* and books by samizdat publishing houses show that the text itself was rarely available in Hungarian and so could only be accessed in Hungary through copies brought in from abroad (mainly illegally) or stored on library shelves closed to the public. The first and the second publicity often wanted something completely different from the same author; in the latter, the clear objective was to unveil the dysfunctions and dark secrets of state socialism, while it was not uncommon that in the first publicity, the same author's socially critical writings were used to debunk Western conditions and decision-makers.

It also becomes apparent that the differences between these two public spheres began to become more uncertain in the second half of 1988, fading away in 1989—as the multifaceted censorship mechanisms become inoperable, and as the non-fiction so characteristic of samizdat started to fill the stands of the underground.

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Keywords

editors, literature, official press, publicity, samizdat

Hungary, Budapest. Golgota Street, Fekete Lyuk ("Black Hole"), alternative club in the basement of the Vörösmarty Cultural Center. On the left is rock musician László "Gazember" Waszlavik; on the right is Anna Vágner, typist for the Samizdat Journal "Beszélő", 1989.

Photo donated by Fortepan / Judit Hegedűs

= Book Review =

Václav Havel, President of the Czechoslovak Republic. The photograph was taken on July 12, 1990, in the Hradzsin (Prague), during a state dinner held on the occasion of the visit of Árpád Göncz, Acting President of Hungary. 1990.

Photo donated by Fortepan / Zoltán Szalay

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=== Deal-makers, Human Rights Activists, and the Everyday Politics of the Helsinki Process

/// A BOOKREVIEW ON

Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds.
The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990.

Berghahn Books, 2019. pp. 380



Abstract

This review examines *The CSCE and the end of the cold war: diplomacy, societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, edited by Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (Berghahn Books, 2019). The volume brings together scholars from Europe and North America to explore the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its 1975 Helsinki Final Act through three thematic clusters: diplomatic agency, transnational activism, and national case studies. The editors explicitly critique the "Kissingerization" of Cold War historiography, advocating instead for a bottom-up perspective attentive to mid-level diplomats, activists, and transnational networks. The review highlights the volume's methodological innovations, particularly its prosopographical approach to diplomatic negotiations and its use of previously inaccessible archival materials. However, it identifies a significant

lacuna: the under-exploration of the intellectual history dimension—how key concepts like "security," "peaceful coexistence," and "sovereignty" were semantically contested and appropriated across different political cultures. A *Begriffsgeschichte* of the Helsinki process would complement the diplomatic and social movement approaches that currently dominate the field.

= = = The Cold War and the Importance of Helsinki

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its 1975 Helsinki Final Act occupy a paradoxical place in Cold War historiography. At the time of signing, the agreement was widely regarded with skepticism or outright hostility across the political spectrum. Henry Kissinger famously dismissed Basket III's provisions as something the Soviets could write "in Swahili" for all the difference they would make.[1] American conservatives attacked President Ford for legitimizing Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, while dissidents behind the Iron Curtain initially saw the conference as a Western capitulation to Brezhnev's desire for recognition of the post-war territorial status quo.[2] Yet within fifteen years, the Helsinki process had come to be seen as a crucial factor in the transformation of East-West relations and the largely peaceful revolutions of 1989.

The Helsinki summit took place at a moment of profound crisis on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the United States, 1975 marked a nadir in national confidence: the Watergate scandal had forced Nixon's resignation the previous year; the Vietnam War ended in April with the humiliating evacuation of Saigon; New York City teetered on the edge of bankruptcy; oil prices continued to climb in the aftermath of the 1973 crisis; crime rates rose steadily; and public trust in political institutions had collapsed. Morgan Neville's recent documentary *Breakdown: 1975* (2025) captures this atmosphere of national crisis through the era's cinema—films like *Chinatown* (1974), *Dog Day Afternoon* (1975), *Taxi Driver* (1976), and *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (1975) —that reflected a society confronting institutional corruption, urban decay, and disillusionment with authority. The Soviet bloc, meanwhile, was entering its long economic stagnation. The crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the subsequent Brezhnev Doctrine had eliminated reformist alternatives within state socialism, leaving opposition movements demoralized

1 = = Jussi Hanhimäki, "'They Can Write it in Swahili': Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973–1975," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2003): 37–58.

2 = = On Ford's domestic difficulties with Helsinki, see Sarah B. Snyder, "'Jerry, Don't Go': Domestic Opposition to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act," *Journal of American Studies* 44, no. 1 (2010): 67–81. Ford later reflected: "So for all these reasons, the European trip was likely to advance our hopes for peace. Yet no journey I made during my Presidency was so widely misunderstood. 'Jerry, don't go', the Wall Street Journal implored, and the New York Times called the trip 'misguided and empty'." Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (Harper & Row, 1979), 300.

and fragmented. Helsinki emerged from this dual crisis—a product of mutual exhaustion as much as mutual aspiration.

This reversal of fortunes has generated a substantial historiography over the past quarter century. Daniel Thomas's *The Helsinki Effect* offered an influential constructivist interpretation, arguing that human rights norms established at Helsinki undermined Communist rule.[3] Samuel Moyn's *The Last Utopia* and the edited volume *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* situated Helsinki within a broader transformation of political language.[4] Michael Cotey Morgan's *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* provided the most comprehensive diplomatic history of the negotiations themselves, based on archival research in eight countries.[5] German scholarship has emphasized the CSCE's roots in *Ostpolitik* and the strategy of "transformation through contacts," notably in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart's edited volume *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe*, a product of the Volkswagen-Stiftung research project at Mannheim.[6] French scholarship has examined Paris's distinctive role, particularly Nicolas Badalassi's award-winning *En finir avec la guerre froide*, which traced French efforts to use the CSCE as a vehicle for overcoming the Cold War order.[7] Finally, Sarah Snyder's *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* documented the transnational networks connecting dissident groups with Western supporters.[8]

The volume under review, edited by Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, builds upon this foundation while seeking to extend it in new directions.[9] This r eview comes six years after the volume's publication, occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of the Helsinki Accords in August 2025 and the conference in The Histo-

3 = = Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton University Press, 2001).

4 = = Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Harvard University Press, 2010); Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

5 = = Michael Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Princeton University Press, 2018).

6 = = Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds., *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe* (Berghahn Books, 2008). See also Gottfried Niedhart, *Entspannung in Europa: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Warschauer Pakt 1966 bis 1975* [Détente in Europe: The Federal Republic of Germany and the Warsaw Pact, 1966–1975] (Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014).

7 = = Nicolas Badalassi, *En finir avec la guerre froide: La France, l'Europe et le processus d'Helsinki, 1965–1975* [Ending the Cold War: France, Europe and the Helsinki Process, 1965–1975] (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014).

8 = = Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

9 = = Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds., *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990* (Berghahn Books, 2019).

rical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (ÁBTL) that forms the basis of this thematic issue. Most recently, Kai Hebel published a monograph tracing Britain's pivotal contribution to the negotiations leading to the Final Act, demonstrating that scholarly interest in the Helsinki process remains very much alive.[10] Bringing together scholars from Europe and North America, *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War* is organized around three thematic clusters: the role of diplomats and diplomacy in shaping the Helsinki process; transnational networks of human rights promotion and dissidence; and national case studies examining how individual states engaged with the CSCE framework. The editors frame the volume as an exploration of how the CSCE contributed to "overcoming the Westphalian system" by inserting human rights, cultural cooperation, and human contacts onto the international agenda—despite Soviet intentions to use the conference primarily for legitimizing existing borders. Notably, the editors explicitly criticize the "Kissingerization" of Cold War historiography—the tendency to write diplomatic history as the deeds of a handful of grand statesmen—and advocate instead for a bottom-up perspective attentive to the agency of mid-level diplomats, activists, and transnational networks.

= = = From the Networks of International Diplomacy to East and West Domestic Politics to Albanian Isolation

The volume's first section examines diplomacy and diplomats, with particular attention to agency and creativity within the negotiating process. Andrei Zagorski's opening chapter traces the evolution of the "human dimension" from 1975 to 1990, showing how the practice of raising individual human rights cases shifted from confidential bilateral channels to public "naming and shaming" after the Carter administration's policy turn at the Belgrade follow-up meeting. Despite this evolution, Zagorski notes that NGOs never gained direct access to the CSCE process; their influence remained mediated through Western governments, and the Human Dimension Mechanism (HDM) ultimately never granted individuals or organizations the right to submit complaints directly.

The chapter by Seth Brown and Angela Romano on diplomatic agency is among the volume's most methodologically innovative contributions. Drawing on the British and French cases, they argue that the 600-plus diplomats who negotiated the Final Act exercised significant autonomy, developing shared professional cultures through lengthy negotiations conducted in esoteric jargon and requiring consensus. Young British Foreign Office diplomats with linguistic skills operated with considerable leeway despite governmental skepticism, while French diplomat Jacques Chazelle's bilateral relationship with Soviet counterpart Yuri Dubinin proved crucial in breaking Basket III stalemates on information exchange. The authors advocate for a prosopographical approach to understanding diplomatic negotiations:

10 = = Kai Hebel, *Britain, Détente, and the Helsinki CSCE: 'Fathers of the Final Act'* (Routledge, 2025).

examining the shared characteristics, career trajectories, and socialization processes of negotiators as a distinct professional community.

Nicolas Badalassi's chapter on French diplomacy offers the volume's closest engagement with the intellectual context. He situates the French CSCE strategy within the broader landscape of 1970s French intellectual life: the "Solzhenitsyn affair," the emergence of the "new philosophers," and a diplomatic tradition reaching back to Talleyrand. French diplomats, led by Jacques Andréani, conceived of the CSCE as enabling an "anthropo-centred" Cold War diplomacy that placed human beings at the center of international relations. Their strategy emphasized the equality and interdependence of the Decalogue principles—placing human rights on equal footing with sovereignty—and promoted cultural cooperation as a potentially "corrosive" tool that might gradually transform Eastern societies. Stephan Kieninger's contribution on Max Kampelman examines how this "hard-nosed pacifist"—a World War II conscientious objector who later joined the Committee on Present Danger—navigated the Reagan administration's internal debates to achieve the Madrid Accord breakthrough despite the crisis of Polish martial law.

The volume's second section turns to transnational activism and dissidence. Elisabetta Vezzosi traces the Committee of Concerned Scientists (CCS), an organization of American academics defending Soviet colleagues, particularly Jewish "refuseniks": Soviet citizens, mostly Jews, whose applications to emigrate had been denied by authorities. The CCS grew to 4,000 members and created networks monitoring Helsinki compliance while engaging with Jackson-Vanik Amendment controversies. Christian Peterson's chapter challenges conventional narratives about the relationship between peace movements and human rights activism, examining groups like the Moscow Trust Group and the Campaign for Peace and Democracy—East and West that sought to bridge the divide between these causes. Jacek Czaputowicz contributes a distinctive personal perspective as a former Freedom and Peace Movement activist, describing how the Helsinki Final Act provided legitimacy for Central European opposition and facilitated cooperation with Western peace movements despite initial mutual mistrust.

Douglas Selvage's chapter on the limits of repression represents an important archival contribution, drawing on Warsaw Pact security service documents to show how the KGB and Stasi suppressed Helsinki monitoring groups but were ultimately constrained by their governments' need for Western economic assistance and arms control agreements. By 1980–82, organized dissent had been crushed across most of the Eastern bloc, including through martial law in Poland. Yet the security services failed to eliminate the transnational Helsinki network because Western actors continued their lobbying and Communist governments remained dependent on Western economic ties—a dynamic Selvage terms "transformation by linkage." Carl Bon Tempo's chapter examines the unexpected domestic applications of the Helsinki Final Act within the United States itself, showing how the National Association

for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) leveraged American human rights commitments abroad to demand attention to racial discrimination at home, and how immigration reformers invoked Final Act provisions on family reunification to advocate liberalizing U.S. immigration law. Together, Selvage's and Bon Tempo's contributions are particularly valuable as indicators of how foreign policy and diplomacy shaped—and were constrained by—domestic politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The third section presents national case studies. Maximilian Graf examines Austria's role as a neutral "diplomatic icebreaker" that maintained Western positions "in neutral clothes" while pursuing bilateral liberalization with Hungary and other Eastern neighbors—an approach that contributed to the speed of 1989's transformations, including Austria's facilitation of East German emigration. Anja Peter traces West German efforts to "save détente" during the early 1980s' superpower tensions, showing how Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher developed a comprehensive pan-European vision prioritizing dialogue over confrontation. Oliver Bange returns to analyze the often neglected military dimension of the CSCE and its connection to the human dimension, arguing that Soviet leaders under Gorbachev traded human rights concessions for security objectives in Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) negotiations—a "sell-out" of societal security for military security, in the Stasi's view. Finally, Mëhill Kaba provides the first detailed analysis of why Albania remained the only European state outside the CSCE process, drawing on newly declassified Albanian archives to show that Tirana's rejection stemmed from ideological opposition and a recognition that internal stability required isolation, rather than primarily from Chinese pressure.

= = = Strengths and Further Perspectives

The CSCE and the End of the Cold War makes genuine contributions to our understanding of the Helsinki process. The prosopographical attention to diplomats as creative agents rather than mere executors of state policy opens productive new avenues for research. The transnational network analysis, building on Snyder's earlier work, demonstrates how non-state actors found multiple ways to engage with and influence the CSCE framework. Several chapters—particularly Selvage's work on security services and Kaba's on Albania—bring previously inaccessible archival materials into scholarly circulation. The volume successfully demonstrates that the Helsinki process unfolded across multiple sites and engaged a far wider range of actors than traditional diplomatic history has acknowledged.

Yet the volume largely bypasses what might be called the intellectual history of the Helsinki process. The conceptual and semantic dimensions of the CSCE—how key terms were contested, translated, and appropriated across different political cultures—remain underexplored. This is a significant lacuna. The Helsinki Final Act was, after all, a linguistic achievement: a carefully negotiated text whose

formulations were parsed, interpreted, and deployed by actors ranging from Soviet ideologists to Czech dissidents to American congressional staffers. How did concepts like "security," "peaceful coexistence," "human contacts," or "sovereignty" carry different meanings and resonances for French diplomats steeped in Gaullist traditions, for Soviet negotiators working within Marxist-Leninist frameworks, and for Central European oppositionists drawing on phenomenological or personalist philosophy?

Badalassi's chapter on French diplomacy gestures toward this dimension by situating CSCE strategy within the context of the "Solzhenitsyn Affair" and the rise of the "new philosophers," but the connection remains suggestive rather than systematically developed. We learn that French diplomats conceived of their approach as "anthropo-centred," but the intellectual genealogy of this concept—its relationship to French personalism, Catholic social thought, or existentialist humanism—is not traced. Similarly, the chapters on Central European dissidence acknowledge the importance of figures like Havel and Michnik but do not examine how these thinkers intellectually reworked Helsinki language within their own philosophical frameworks. Havel's concept of "living in truth," for instance, drew on Jan Patočka's phenomenology and represented a distinctive appropriation of human rights discourse quite different from either Western liberal or Soviet socialist understandings—yet this conceptual transformation receives little attention.

A *Begriffsgeschichte* of the Helsinki process—tracing how key concepts were semantically contested during negotiations and subsequently appropriated across different contexts—would complement the diplomatic and social movement approaches that currently dominate the field. It is notable that the one systematic at-tempt at linguistic analysis of the Final Act—Giuseppe Mininni's sociosemiotic study published in the *Journal of Pragmatics* in 1991—emerged from discourse analysis rather than from historical scholarship and has remained entirely isolated from CSCE historiography.[11] Such an intellectual history might examine how the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs" could be simultaneously invoked by Soviet diplomats defending their sphere of influence and by Western negotiators insisting that human rights violations were legitimate subjects of international concern. It might trace how "peaceful coexistence," a concept with deep roots in Soviet ideological discourse going back to Lenin and codified by Khrushchev, was resignified through the Helsinki process into something quite different from its original meaning. And it might explore how dissident thinkers translated Helsinki

11 == Giuseppe Mininni, "The Will to Peace: A Sociosemiotic Analysis of the Helsinki 'Final Act'," *Journal of Pragmatics* 15, no. 6 (1991): 465–86, https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166(91)90049-4. Mininni's article analyzed the Final Act as diplomatic discourse, examining the "dia-text"—the dialectics of meaning generation—and the semantic contestation of concepts like "solidarity," "equality," and "justice." The study emerged from a Vienna Centre research project but has had no discernible impact on historical scholarship.

language into local intellectual traditions: how Charter 77's invocation of the Final Act drew on specifically Czech philosophical resources, or how Polish opposition figures connected Helsinki norms to their own traditions of democratic thought.

The volume's focus on the period up to 1990 also means that longer-term questions about the Helsinki legacy remain unaddressed. How did the conceptual innovations of the CSCE process shape post-Cold War understandings of security, sovereignty, and human rights? The transformation of the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the subsequent challenges to the "Helsinki order"—from the Yugoslav wars through the current crisis in European security—suggest that the conceptual tensions embedded in the Final Act were never fully resolved, merely deferred.

These critical observations should not obscure the volume's real achievements. Badalassi and Snyder have assembled a collection that significantly advances our understanding of how diplomacy, societies, and human rights interacted within the CSCE framework. The book will be essential reading for scholars of Cold War international history, human rights, and European integration. But it also points toward further work needed: a fuller engagement with intellectual history approaches that might illuminate not just what actors did but how they understood what they were doing, and how those understandings were shaped by—and in turn reshaped—the conceptual vocabularies available to them.

= = = = Literature = = = =

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